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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that the positive portrayal of the Gulen (Hizmet) movement in the New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal is a direct result of persistent Orientalism in the American
academia and news media. The evidence reveals that most of the articles published in the New
York Times and in the Wall Street Journal Between 1985 and 2016 and the majority of academic
works completely ignored the controversial nature of the Gulen movement. This favorable
approach portrays Islam as monolithic and indicates the otherness of Muslims by subjecting them
to a separate set of standards for “moderation.” This is problematic for two distinct reasons. First,
it shows that Orientalism is still persistent well into the year 2016. Furthermore, when referring
to Gulen as “moderate and progressive,” the journalists and academics falsely portray all Muslims
negatively since this portrayal indicates Gulen’s ideology is moderate in comparison to all
interpretations of Islam.

vi

INTRODUCTION: ORIENTALISM, THE NEWS MEDIA, AND THE GULEN
MOVEMENT
The negative portrayal of Islam, Muslims and Muslim societies in the news media has
been a growing issue since the 1970s. Scholars explained this inaccurate and negative portrayal
with the tumultuous political environment of the 1970s. Oil Embargo, the Islamic Revolution in
Iran and the Hostage Crisis were among the main events that turned the American attention to
Islam and eventually to its negative portrayal. The relatively positive atmosphere of the postWWII lasted roughly until the end of the Afghan-Soviet War in 1989. While the negative news
media attention started to portray Muslims and Islam as one-dimensional and almost always as a
threat to the security of the United States, the collaboration between the United States and the
Afghan rebels, mujahedeen, continued to garner positive attention. The negative portrayal gained
momentum with the beginning of the 1990s and eventually reached its peak after the September
11 attacks with the “War on Terror” and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Research has repeatedly
shown that Muslims, Islam, and especially Arabs in the media disproportionally represented as
violent and uncivilized. Human rights abuses in Muslim majority societies often featured in the
news for the last twenty-five years; yet, the recent consistent trend in the Muslim-majority
nations is to better the lives of their members. From Saudi Arabia to Morocco, societies of
different sects of Islam and minorities started to demand and earn more rights. An examination of
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal’s approach to Islam from 1985 to 2016
demonstrate the persistence of Orientalism. The Orientalist approach employed by both of these
newspapers emphasized the otherness of Muslims and strengthen the civilized vs. uncivilized
narrative. During the 1980s there was little to no public interest in Muslim-majority societies but
the interest grew significantly during the 1990s and reached its peak after the September 11
attacks. Certain issues also garnered the attention of journalists; issues regarding child marriage,
1

violence against women and the lack of LGBTQ+ rights were the main issues both the New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal persistently reported on; access to healthcare and modern
education, however, were the kind of issues that often went overlooked. In addition to specific
issues, a specific person's and a movement's actions were often overlooked as well: Fethullah
Gulen and the Gulen (Hizmet) movement.1 Even though the Gulen movement’s ideology
contributes negatively to the most urgent issues in the Islamic world and his ideology contradicts
the clauses on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both the American academics and
American journalists insistently portrayed the movement and Fethullah Gulen himself as
positively. Both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal dismissed the Turkish concerns
as if they were coming from some radical faction and referred to the critics of Gulen simply as
“seculars,” and/or indicated their support of the Turkish Armed Forces, which is an entity that
enacted several coups over the course of modern Turkey’s history, allegedly to protect the
secularism principle. The journalists who were somewhat critical of Gulen and the Gulen
movement lacked in-depth analysis of Gulen’s ideology and primarily focused on the corruption
allegations of Gulen affiliated charter schools, Gulen’s leadership, and/or the Turkish state’s
accusation where Gulen was suspected of instructing his followers to infiltrate the state
institutions. The critical articles never pointed out his remarks where he encouraged violence
against women –even instructed when and how to beat women. Never pointed out his unscientific
approach to modern science and especially to the scientific theory of evolution which was
especially worth noting since he is known for his STEM-oriented schools and famously claims
that religion and science must be complementary to each other rather than being rivals. None of
the articles even mentioned Gulen’s deep hatred of the LGBTQ+ individuals and atheists while

1

Hizmet means service in Turkish.
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so vehemently arguing that he promotes tolerance. I argue that the journalists’ reluctance to point
out these issues can be explained by two interrelated factors. First of all, there is an absolute
favoritism of Gulen and the Gulen movement in the American academia. American academics
completely ignored the characteristics of Gulen’s ideology that would never be accepted in a
Western and Judeo-Christian movement/ideology and portrayed Gulen and his movement as the
egalitarian and progressive future of Islam. Secondly, I argue that Orientalism, as defined by
Edward Said in 1979, still dominates Western journalism. While, after 9/11 the journalists’
approach seemed to be changed and became more nuanced towards the Muslims, Muslim
societies, and Islam the evidence that is provided in this thesis demonstrates that this change was
extremely small in scale. This thesis aims to demonstrate the persistence of Orientalism in the
U.S. news media, specifically in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal, and the
absolute favoritism of the American academia of Gulen and the Gulen movement caused the
false-representation of Gulen and the Gulen movement.
The majority of the previous research on the portrayal of Islam and/or Muslims focused
on the negative portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the news media. Unlike the previous research,
this thesis examines Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement’s portrayal in the news media by
asking the question “Why does the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal portray Fethullah
Gulen and the Gulen movement positively?” I argue that in addition to the approaches employed
by the journalists, the academia’s approach is equally important in order to accurately portray a
foreign group such as the Gulen movement. The Gulen (Hizmet/Service) Movement is a
religiopolitical movement that originated in Turkey in the 1960s and became internationally
known after it reached financial independence during the late 1980s and early 1990s.2 Despite the

2

Tugrul Keskin, "Market Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” in Secular State and Religious Society: Two Forces in
Play in Turkey, ed. B. Turam (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 130.
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positive attention attracted from politicians, scholars, and journalists the Gulen movement is
surrounded by controversy. The movement was alleged to have three to six million followers and
own the largest network of charter schools in the United States with more than a hundred and
sixty schools.3 The Movement established more than a thousand schools worldwide as of 2015.4
One of the most praised aspects of the movement is their STEM-oriented secular schools.
Gulenists claim that science and Islam can co-exist and that they teach these principles in their
schools. Yet, the movement’s schools attracted some criticism due to their allegedly corrupt HB1 visa policies that allegedly take place in some schools to bring Gulenist teachers to the U.S. 5
The H-B1 practices of the schools posed an issue for the U.S. labor force since these schools
outsourced their teachers from Turkey. Recently, Los Angeles terminated three allegedly
Gulenist charter schools based on fraudulent H-B1 practices.6
Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement dealt, and are still, dealing with more serious
accusations. In 1999 the Turkish government accused Gulen of posing a threat to the secular
Turkish state. This accusation was made after a leaked footage of Gulen showed him giving

3
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directions to his followers on how to infiltrate the state institutions.7 Since these accusations,
Gulen has been living in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania.8 Gulen was later acquitted from the
charges against him in 2006 during Erdogan’s administration before Erdogan and the Movement
have fallen out.9 More recently, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accused
Fethullah Gulen and the movement for the failed coup attempt of 2016.10 These accusations were
publicly denied by Gulen in both cases.11
The Gulen Movement was named after its founder Fethullah Gulen, who was born in
Erzurum in 1938 and employs Sunni religious figure Said Nursi's ideas.12 Gulen's writings,
according to his followers, promote the idea that modernity and tradition can co-exist along with
Islam and modern science.13 The Gulen Movement started to flourish when Gulen moved to
Izmir, an Aegean city in Western Turkey during the early 1960s, after teaching at a mosque in
Edirne. During this time, his movement became known as Izmir Community, which later evolved
into the Gulen/Hizmet (service) movement during the 1960s and 70s.14 Gulen started to invest in
education in Izmir where he emphasized that Islamic values, STEM, and philosophy could co-
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FGulen.com, September 24, 2001, accessed September 4, 2018,
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M. Hakan Yavuz and John L Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement (Syracuse,
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 19.
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Ibid, 20.
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Bulent Aras and Omer Caha, “Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ Movement,” Rubin Center,
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Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” 127.
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exist. Gulen explained how science and Islam could co-exist by stating that God works through
science:
[…] God manifests His Names through veils, although His absolute Unity demands that
we attribute the effects directly to His causes to veil His acts, so that people not ascribe
Him the things and events that seem unacceptable to them.15
This quote was further explained by Ahmet T. Kuru in “Search for a Middle Way,” as “[…] one
may attribute a death, for example, to a material cause (e.g., an illness), to the Angel of Death,
and directly to God, simultaneously and without any contradiction.”16 When Gulen and the
movement claimed the co-existent nature of philosophy and Islam, they did not specify the kind
of philosophy they referred to. Gulen affiliated education institutions attracted children of
economically underprivileged families from rural and more conservative parts of Turkey to create
the Golden Generation (Altin Nesil) who would get into the best Turkish universities and hold
jobs in the government bureaucracy.17
The Turkish state came to regard Gulen and the Gulen movement as anti-communist and
anti-left wing force with the growing concerns of the Soviet expansionism during the early years
of the Cold War.18 Gulen was always sympathetic to the anti-communism struggle and played a
role in the founding of Turkiye Komunizmle Mucadale Dernekleri (Turkish Association for
Struggle Against Communism).19 The Gulen Movement became the biggest pro-NATO and proAmerican religious group in Turkey.20 When Prime Minister Turgut Ozal came into power in
1983, after the Coup D’état of 1980, Fethullah Gulen worked with Ozal to promote his ideology

15

Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 121.
Ibid.
17
Keskin, "Market Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” 127-128.
18
Ibid, 22.
19
Lâtif Erdoḡan, Fethullah Gulen Hocaefendi: küçük dünyam (İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1997), 78.; Yavuz and
Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 22.
20
Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 22.
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on a broader scale.21 During this time Gulen’s education campaign became nationalized and later
internationalized.22 To bolster his new Turkish identity where Ottoman legacy, Islam, modernity,
and the free-market economy came together, Gulen worked with Ozal and became close with
state institutions.23 The 1980s were also the time where Gulenists established successful
businesses, financial institutions, and a media empire.24
As I mentioned above, Gulen’s ideology is essentially hostile to women, nonbelievers/atheists, LGBTQ+ individuals, and modern science. Gulen’s ideology contributes
negatively to the most urgent issues Muslims and Muslim societies suffer continuously because
of economic hardship, systematic corruption, misinterpretation of religion and for other various
reasons. Gender and sexual orientation-based discrimination are among the most urgent issues
the Muslim societies need to overcome. Infidelity, premarital sex, flirting, or any contact with the
opposite sex can be the reason for violence against children, LGBTQ+ community, and women
under the name of “honor killings.” While honor killings are not limited to the Muslim world,
and with the exception of Iran, none of the North African or the Middle Eastern country have
“honor laws” derived from Islam, the numbers of women who were killed as a result of honorbased violence were relatively high in the region of the Middle East.25 Feminist scholar Phyllis
Chesler stated that even if an honor killing was persecuted in a Muslim country the perpetrators
usually got relatively lighter sentences in her article “Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings.”26

21

Ibid, 35.; Keskin, "Market Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” 129.
Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 37-38.
23
Ibid, 35-36.
24
Ibid, 36.
22
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“Honour Killings By Region,” Honor Based Violence Awareness Network, accessed February 5, 2018, http://hbvawareness.com/regions/.
26
Phyllis Chesler, “Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings,” Middle East Quarterly, March 1, 2010, accessed
September 4, 2018, http://www.meforum.org/2646/worldwide-trends-in-honor-killings.
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According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Bangladesh, Great Britain,
Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Pakistan, Morocco, Sweden, Turkey, and
Uganda are among the countries where honor killings take place.27 The Express Tribune, one of
the major English language newspapers in Pakistan, reported that a man murdered his wife based
on a dream he had where she was cheating on him. The same outlet reported another murder of a
woman by her husband as a result of a love song dedicated to her through the radio, the husband
slit the woman’s throat in the town square.28 Child marriage is also rampant in Muslim majority
countries. 32% of Yemeni girls were married before the age of 18; the number was 19% in
Palestine, 17% in Egypt and Iraq.29 A Yemeni child, who was only 8, suffered from internal
injuries on her “wedding night” after marrying a 40-year-old man, the Guardian reported in
2013.30 A similar incident took place in 2010 when a 12-year-old child was killed as a result of
her injuries as reported by CNN.31 In 2010, Fox News reported that another Yemeni girl, who
was 13, died as a result of marital rape; “legislation to ban child brides has been stalled by
opposition from religious leaders,” the report continued.32
According to the Pew Research Center, when asked if society should accept
homosexuality 94% of Tunisians, 97% of Jordanians, 78% of Turks, and 98% of Nigerians

27

“Impunity for domestic violence, ‘honour killings’ cannot continue – UN official,” UN News, accessed February 5,
2018,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33971&Cr=violence+against+women&Cr1#.WnggSJP1VA.
28
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“Child Marriage in the Middle East and North Africa,” PRB, accessed December 8, 2017,
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30
Janise Elise, “Yemeni Child Bride, Eight, ‘Dies on Wedding Night,’” Guardian, September 11, 2013, accessed
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31
Mohammed Jamjoom, “Yemeni Child Bride Dies of Internal Bleeding,” CNN World, April 9, 2010,
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32
“Dead Yemeni Child Bride Tied up, Raped, Says Mom,” Fox News World, April 10, 2010, accessed
September 4, 2018, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/10/dead-yemeni-child-bride-tied-raped-saysmom.html.
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answered negatively. In comparison, 88% of Spaniards, 87% of Germans, 74% of Argentinians,
60% of Americans answered “yes.”33 Only 43%, 55%, and 50% of Middle Easterners answered
positively when asked if “People can say what they want?” “Media can report the news?” and
“People can use the internet?” Whereas the numbers were as high as 71%, 67% and 69% in the
U.S.34 According to a Tunis-based organization, Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific
Organisation (ALECSO), 46.5% of women in the region were illiterate.35 When asked if women
should decide to wear the hijab Only 30% answered the question positively in Afghanistan, 45%
in Jordan, and 30% in Congo.36 The law mandates that women must cover their hair and wear
unfitting clothes in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Dr. Salman Hameed, who teaches astronomy and
religion at Hampshire College, stated that “In Turkey, one of the more secular Muslim countries,
the [acceptance level of evolution] is between 22 and 25%.”37 The acceptance rate of evolution is
40% in the US.38 The percentage of people who identified themselves as “evolutionists” was 68
in Sweden and 65 in Germany.39
Despite these issues and human rights abuses in Muslim societies, American journalists
who write for the two biggest news outlets in the United States by circulation, the New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal, promoted a movement that either supports or do nothing to

33

“The Global Divide on Homosexuality,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, June 4, 2013, accessed
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eliminate these issues, as the new and moderate face of Islam. Academics and journalists often
portrayed the Gulen movement as a moderate movement that promoted modern science
education, women’s rights and tolerance even though the Gulen movement’s objectives would
contribute to the human rights abuses in the Muslim societies instead of eliminating them as
suggested by the academics and the journalists.
The Gulen movement is not unique for attracting an positive interest from the
journalists, during the height of the Cold War the United States portrayed other fundamentalist
groups or governments as “friends,” or “freedom fighters.” After World War II, Islam was seen
as a unifying force against Communism by America and during the Soviet-Afghan war, millions
of dollars were poured to the Afghan mujahideen, who later evolved into Taliban.40 The
Orientalist historian Maxime Rodinson stated that "Western Christendom perceived the Muslim
world as a menace long before it began to be seen as a real problem.”41 Albert Hourani stated that
the Christian Western world perceived Islam as a false religion and believed that "Islam was
invented by men whose motives and character deplored and propagated by the sword.”42 The
world witnessed the shift of political power from the old world to the new world with the end of
World War II. This was branded and polished with the Cold War Era, which has seen the race
between the U.S. and the USSR from space research to developing nuclear arms. During the Cold
War Era (1947 – 1991), intellectual migration to the U.S. became a trend. As a result of all these
developments, the Orientalist European view of Islam has found itself a new nest in the U.S.

40

Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the
Region (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), 119-120.
41
Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique of Islam (New York, NY: I.B Tauris, 2002), 3.
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Fawaz A. Gerges, “Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 588, no: 1 (2003): 74, accessed September 4, 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1049855.
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universities.43 The mythical, monolithic, and homogenous Islam turned the American
policymakers to Islam as an official anti-communist tool. The Eisenhower administration hoped
that King Sa’ud ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia could be a unifying force among Muslims
against the communist threat.44 During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, America sided
with a possible Islamic alliance that would serve their interests rather than increased Arab
nationalism.45 With the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the U.S. became even more involved
with the region and with Islam. The Carter administration’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski hoped to employ Islam as a unifying force against the Soviets as well and unleashed a
series of propaganda aimed to the Muslims in the USSR.46 According to Gil Guerrero’s
“Propaganda Broadcasts and Cold War Politics: The Carter Administration’s Outreach to Islam,”
the State Department-sponsored scholars “to give an impartial academic assessment that
concurred with the goals of the public diplomacy campaign.”47 Guerrero noted that journalist
Robert Dreyfuss explained how the U.S. unleashed radical Islam to further its interests in the
region in his book Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist
Islam.48
The 1970s was the decade Islam and Muslims became to be perceived as a threat by
Americans. Fawaz Gerges argued that the American perception of the Middle East changed
during the 1970s as a result of the powerful emergence of political Islam.49 He listed the 1973

43
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Arab-Israeli War, Arab Oil Embargo, and the 1978/9 Iranian Revolution along with the hostage
crisis as the causes of the shift in perception. As a result of these events, many American officials
started to perceive Islam as a threat to “Western interests.”50 Edward Said also argued that the Oil
Embargo and the hostage crisis played major roles in this perception in Covering Islam. Said
stated that this half ideological half fictional label was solidified with the coverage of the Iranian
Hostage crisis, where Iran and thus Islam became synonymous with religious radicalism and
terrorism.51 Melani McAlister stated that “Islam’ became highlighted as the dominant signifier of
the [Middle East], rather than oil wealth, Arabs, or Christian Holy Lands.”52 Gerges also argued
that Muammar Qaddafi’s employment of Islam in order to legitimize his rule played a major role
in shifting American perception even long before the Iranian revolution.53 According to Gerges,
terrorism was another major reason why the American perception of Islam shifted radically. With
the ending of the Cold War and starting with the 1990s the terrorist attacks that targeted
Americans contributed to the negative perception of Islam and Muslims even further.54 Richard
Bulliet, a scholar from the Columbia University, stated that the Americans were becoming to
identify Muslims with terrorism and started to see Muslims as a part of a culture “that cannot be
tolerated or reasoned with.”55
Representations and portrayals of Muslims and Islam changed accordingly. After the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, an International Herald Tribune article stated that even though
this particular attack was done by an American, most terrorist attacks targeting Americans were
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perpetrated by Middle Easterners.56 Gerges stated that this argument was not factual and that
there had been more terrorist attacks against the American citizens by non-Muslims in the last ten
years.57 Abdulaziz Atiyah Al-Zahrani’s unpublished dissertation “U.S. television and press
coverage of Islam and Muslims,” established that most stories in the American media regarding
Muslims were about crises and the general portrayal of Muslims, as a result, were negative.58 The
article “Press Treatment of Islam: What Kind of Picture Do the Media Paint?” noted that the
President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt portrayed negatively and contradictorily since he was
likened to Hitler and referred to as a “crypto-communist” at the same time.59 Matthew F. Jacobs
was in agreement and stated that during the early Cold War, the U.S. policymakers, academics,
and journalists often had contradictory understandings of Islam.60 Kashif Z. Sheikh, Vincent
Price, and Hayg Oshagan suggested that both Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein were
portrayed as inhuman and labeled as “mad dogs” in “Press Treatment of Islam: What Kind of
Picture Do the Media Paint .”61 The article also explained the negative attitude against Islam with
cultural and linguistic ignorance of the reporters.62 Since the West had similar interests in the
Muslim world, they influenced their reporters “to use preferred frames when reporting on issues
in the area. This helps create more favorable public opinion locally and increased political capital
for policy initiatives internationally.”63 The authors concluded that “Particular international
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events, depending on whether they are viewed positively or negatively, will determine the tone of
news stories about Muslims.”64 Deepa Kumar pointed out the lack of studies on the positive
portrayal of Islam in the media, even though Islam was promoted by the United States during the
Cold War.65 Kumar concluded that “When ‘Islamic unity’ was useful in the prosecution of the
Cold War, the news media covered it positively, in contrast to the current period in which a
transnational Islamist network is presented as an existential threat.”66 Kumar furthered his
argument by stating that when Islam “is in service to US foreign policy objectives was the ‘right
kind of Islam.”67
For example, when the U.S. was aiding the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War,
the war crimes committed by the mujahedeen were not reported often by the New York Times and
the Wall Street Journal. David Binder from the New York Times referred to the mujahedeen as
“anti-communist rebels” in “U.S. Aides Say Afghanistan Army is Crumbling Under Rebel
Pressure.”68 While the article positively portrayed the mujahedeen by referring them as “anticommunists,” it also stated that the tribal insurgency especially got stronger after the Sovietbacked literacy campaign was popular among women, and this caused “Strong antagonism
among the tradition-minded, male-oriented Afghans.”69 In contrast, Terence Smiths’s article from
the New York times also referred to the mujahedeen as rebels but did not provide any context of
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their insurgency.70 Leslie Gelb also chose to refer to the mujahedeen as “guerillas” or
“insurgency,” without mentioning their Islamic roots.71 Another Gelb article from 1984, while
reported the $625 million aid went to the mujahedeen, did not mention the motives of the
rebels.72 Richard Halloran reported in 1986 that there was a possibility of Reagan government
extending the diplomatic recognition of the mujahedeen, also did not touch upon the radical
nature of the group.73 Elaine Sciolino’s article reported that the Bush administration was going to
continue to fund Afghan rebels in 1989 and referred to the mujahedeen as “rebels.”74 This
positive sentiment changed with the nearing of the end of the war. John F. Burns’ article, that was
published in 1989, dealt with one of the guerrilla groups in the seven-member rebel coalition in
Afghanistan. It was reported that after a series of criticism directed to the Islamic Party’s use of
weapons, the Bush administration cut the faction from receiving any munitions from America.75
The article identified the head of the group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as a Muslim fundamentalist
and noted that he described America as an “immoral society,” while “his fighters were receiving
a third to a half of all American military aid to the Afghan rebels, valued over the years at
hundreds of millions of dollars.” 76 Burns also pointed out that Hekmatyar visited the U.S. once
in 1985 but refused to meet President Reagan, in contrast to Sciolino’s article published mere
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months ago.77 Tim Weiner’s article from 1993 reported that the U.S. would spend $55 million to
try to get back more than three hundred Stinger antiaircraft missiles that were once provided to
the mujahedeen by the U.S. Weiner’s article mentioned Hekmatyar, like Burn’s article, and noted
that he became the prime minister of Afghanistan and that he forged an alliance with Iran.78
As we are going to see the examples below, this attitude that mainly ignored the threat
and glossed over the mujahedeen was not much different on the pages of the Wall Street Journal
either. In “U.S. Is Cautious in Aiding Afghan Rebels,” published in 1984 the mujahedeen was
only referred as Afghan rebels, and the U.S.’ cautious behavior when supporting the mujahedeen
was explained by the smaller chance of the mujahedeen stood against the Soviet troops.79 Unlike
the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal pointed out the inclination of Afghan rebels, even
though they were currently allies, towards “Moslem fundamentalism,” in 1984.80 However,
another article from 1984 about financial corruption among the Afghan rebels did not refer to
Islamic radicalism or fundamentalism at all.81 A 1985 article reported that the mujahedeen visited
the United Nations, looking for political recognition. The article referred to Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar as “Head of the large Hizbi Islami resistance group and chief spokesman for the
delegation,” and quoted him when he said, "The Soviet conduct in Afghanistan makes a mockery
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of the U.N. charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, international law and the norms of
civilized behavior."82 Claudia Rosett’s article published in 1988, referred to the mujahedeen as
“mujahideen” and mentioned a Soviet-backed terrorism campaign in Pakistan was aiming to end
Pakistan’s aid to the mujahedeen. The article did not mention the radical trend inside the
mujahedeen or Hekmatyar’s anti-Americanism while pointing out that it was the Carter
administration started the aid and the Reagan administration was continuing it.83 Finally, with the
shift in the approach by the end of the war in 1989, S. J. Masty referred to the problematic
aspects of the mujahedeen, the radicalism of Hekmatyar, and the growing Wahhabi influence
inside the state.84 This shows that U.S. interests have had changed as the mujahideen evolved
from an ally to a radical political entity. And the rhetoric in both the New York Times and the
Wall Street Journal changed accordingly.
As mentioned by David Binder in the New York Times one of the major reasons behind
the insurgency against the elected Afghan government in Afghanistan was the introduced
reforms. Peter Marsden explained in The Taliban: war and religion in Afghanistan, that the
literacy campaign and women and girls’ education especially angered the rural Afghan
population.85 Valentine M. Moghadam also agreed that the ruling party, People’s Democratic
Party of Afghanistan, tried to introduce a series of reforms where women’s emancipation was
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linked to “Modernization, development, and socialism.”86 Moghadam explained that there was a
strong male backlash to the introduced reforms especially to the ones that declared women free in
choosing their marriage partners and the abolishing of “brideprice,” where the groom’s family
was expected to pay a certain sum in order to marry the girl, and the right of women to divorce.87
Marsden stated that “The anger of population found an appropriate outlet in the unifying call for
Jihad.”88 Huma Ahmed-Ghosh stated that while the mujahedeen mobilized as a result of a
perceived Soviet threat against Islam and their cultural values, their victory in Afghanistan
brought an “unprecedented barbarism” between the years 1992 and 1996 during the Taliban
regime. According to Ahmed-Ghosh, bodily harm against women such as amputations, femicide,
and rapes were so common that many young women chose to end their lives in order to avoid
violence and forced marriages.89 Women’s freedom was severely limited during this time, they
were not allowed to be outside other than to buy food, they had to be accompanied by a male
relative, their dress code was strictly limited to burqa and no make-up or “fancy shoes,” they
were not allowed to go to school or visit male doctors in addition to the widespread practice of
forced marriages and rape.90 It would be safe to say that during the 1980s these news outlets
disregarded the mujahedeen’s anti-women stance.
The news media’s influence over politics and public opinion is a debated subject. While
there is no direct evidence that policymakers are influenced from the news media, coverage of
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certain issues may serve as interpretation and anticipation tools.91 It is also clear that the news
media is responsible for creating and/or shaping the public opinion. For example, various
research has shown that the news media played a major role in influencing foreign aid
allocations; every New York Times story that covered a disaster raised approximately $1.7 million
in aid. 92 Perhaps the most famous influence credited to the news media was Judith Miller’s
articles published in the New York Times before the Iraq War in 2003. Thomas E. Ricks in Fiasco
argued that the breaking newspaper stories in the New York Times further distorted the already
fouled intelligence process of the Bush administration before the invasion of Iraq. The Bush
administration justified the invasion based on their strong belief of Iraq’s possession of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). Judith Miller, a credible the New York Times journalist, published a
series of articles that supported the WMD narrative. “U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest For ABomb Parts,” co-authored with Michael Gordon was published on September 8th and claimed that
only a mushroom cloud would be a more credible evidence than what already exists to prove
Saddam Hussein was trying to build an atomic bomb.93 Fiasco quoted an unnamed senior
military officer who argued that "The media has far more effect on intelligence analysis than you
probably realize."94 Miller traveled to Iraq and followed the search for the WMD conducted by
the U.S. military, later she reported that the WMD were destroyed by the Iraqi officials and that
experts had “found sources of radioactive material.”95 The New York Times resisted criticism for
more than a year until running a review that was somewhat critical of Miller’s reporting.96 Judith
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Miller’s career, on the other hand, ended at the New York Times after she named her source as
Lewis Libby, Dick Cheney’s chief of staff and national security advisor.97 In a recent study from
2017, Jeffrey Bachman accused the New York Times for purposefully reporting misleading
information about the civilian casualties of drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan ordered by the
Obama administration. 98 In “The New York Times and Washington Post: Misleading the public
about US drone strikes,” Bachman also argued that this misleading behavior resulted in a lack of
understanding of the consequences of the drone strikes among the Americans and a lack of public
opinion.99 Similarly, Robin Stevens argued that newspaper coverage influence news coverage by
other media outlets and shape and/or influence public opinion. 100
While the measurable extent of the news media’s influence over policymakers and
public opinion is open to debate, it is clear that the news media plays an important role in both of
them. This thesis only focuses on the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal since they are
the largest news outlets in the United States by circulation. The New York Times is considered by
its readers, and by itself, as the paper of record. 101 The phrase “newspaper of record,” means that
a newspaper that is considered authoritative and could be used as a historical source based on its
established attention to detail and in-depth reporting. The phrase originated after the New York
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Times started to continuously publish an index of subjects that the day’s paper included in
1913.102 Former the New York Times executive Max Frankel described his newspaper as:
It is the “house organ” of the smartest, most talented, and most influential Americans at
the height of American power. And while its editorial opinions or the views of individual
columnists and critics can be despised or dismissed, the paper’s daily package of news
cannot. It frames the intellectual and emotional agenda of serious Americans.103
The Wall Street Journal is the second largest newspaper in the U.S. by circulation after
the New York Times.104 The Wall Street Journal, while being reputable for its credibility and
accuracy also argued to reflect American capitalism and to serve the financial elite by Michal
Soffer and Ari Rimmerman in “Representations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
employment-related issues in the Wall Street Journal (1990–2008): a feasibility study.” 105 The
Economist magazine called the Wall Street Journal “The Bible of American conservatism.” 106
After the Wall Street Journal was acquired by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, the
newspaper became less focused on business and increasingly more focused on foreign affairs and
politics. According to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism from
2011, the Wall Street Journal became competitive with the New York Times.107 In addition to
being the two largest newspapers by circulation, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal
are also significantly distinct from each other being on the different ends of the political
spectrum. Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro differentiated between the political leanings of
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the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal by employing text categorization in order to
determine the political leaning of the newspapers. First, they identified phrases mostly used by
conservatives and liberals, such as the use of “death tax” by conservatives and “estate tax” by
liberals, and then examined the language of the newspapers to determine their political
leanings.108 According to this text categorization, the Wall Street Journal employed more
conservative phraseology than the New York Times and vice versa. Pew Research Center’s 2010
survey also demonstrated that the 45% the Wall Street Journal readers identified as conservatives
whereas 11% of the New York Times readers identified as conservative.109
The coverage of Islam in the Western media is a well-studied subject around the world.
Elizabeth Pool, from Keele University, United Kingdom, argued that mass media played an
important role in the production of knowledge and that British Muslims were negatively
portrayed in the British mass media.110 Anna Korteweg from the University of Toronto, Canada,
argued that Islam had been portrayed as homogenized and a monolithic entity in Canada and
often negatively.111 In addition to the news media, the Western popular culture also stereotyped
Muslim. Jack Shaheen focused on the Muslim Arabs’ portrayal in Hollywood and demonstrated
that the Muslim societies and Muslims were portrayed as uncivilized and as religious fanatics.112
Evelyn Alsultany examined the positive portrayal of Muslims in popular culture and argued that
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the “seemingly positive representations of Arabs and Muslims have helped to form a new kind of
racism,” since they legitimized racist policies and practices. In the post-racial era of the United
States, argued Alsultany, the other was not portrayed as the evil but as the sympathetic victim.113
Coming back to the American news media, the most prominent work that dealt with the
Muslim image in the media was Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How
We See the Rest of the World, which was written in 1981 by Edward Said. Said stated that
Muslims were only featured on the mainstream media as “Oil suppliers or as potential
terrorists.”114 Said also pointed out the difference between the approaches employed by the
United States and England and France since the United States did not have a colonialist past like
the other two. Islam only started to become relevant to America after World War II. Because of
the lack of historical awareness, argued Said, there was no room for a non-ideological look at
Islam or at the Arab-world that went beyond “pro/anti-American.”115 Said stated that almost
every American journalist employed a “subliminal consciousness,” that “makes press
independence subordinate to what are often only implicit expressions of loyalty and patriotism, of
simple national identification.”116 Said furthered this argument by stating that “The American
media inevitably collect information on the outside world inside a framework dominated by
government policy.”117 According to Said the way the press approached the subject matter
directly correlated with the audience’s expectations:
The obliteration of the methodological consciousness is absolutely coterminous with the
presence of the market, for news as well as whole clienteles of security-conscious
113
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consumers (governments, corporations, foundations): one simply does not ask why one
does what one does if there is an appreciative, or at least a potentially receptive,
clientele.118
Said also explained how Islam became a commodity in academia in relation to expectations:
Worse yet, the scholar stops thinking in terms of the region and the people about whom
studies are being conducted. Islam, if it is “Islam” that is being studied, is not an
interlocutor but in a sense a commodity. The overall result is a kind of institutional bad
faith. The scholarly honor and integrity of the field are upheld against critical outsiders,
scholarly rhetoric is willfully arrogant about denying political partisanship, and scholarly
self-congratulation fortifies present practices (principally in popular journalism)
indefinitely.119
Said stated that scholars tended to work on Islamic issues only if there was a public interest and
this made the scholarship solely focused on American interests. Said stated that little other than
“good,” and “bad Muslim” stories were covered in the media because anything else was
considered irrelevant to the United States. 120 Said argued that it was the same for the academic
community. Anything outside of extremism, terrorism, and violence were little studied in the
academia when it came to Islam because the non-academic interest was scarce.121
While Said’s work could be considered outdated since it was written in 1981, more
recent studies also argued that Orientalism was still the prominent approach to Islam in the
American media. Saifuddin Ahmed from Johns Hopkins University and Jorg Matthes from the
University of Vienna argued that there was an anti-Muslim discourse in the Western media and it
started with the Iranian Revolution of 1979.122 Islamic studies and journalism scholar Karim H.
Karim stated that after 9/11 Muslims started to occupy the space once occupied by the
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communists in American minds.123 Karim also pointed out that the word “Islamic” became a
popular label to describe radical terrorists’ actions by the journalists. Islam became a focal point
on the news and the many newspapers such as the New York Times, Newsweek, and Time featured
headlines that connected Islam to terrorism.124 Indian scholar, Smeeta Mishra, also claimed that
the Washington Post portrayed the Saudi women as oppressed and in need of Western rescue.125
This argument that the American media extensively covered the “oppressed Muslim women” for
propaganda purposes had also been scrutinized by Lila Abu-Lughod in Do Muslim Women Need
Saving?.126 In addition to Abu-Lughod, author Evelyn Alsultany argued that the oppressed
Muslim women narrative dominated the news after 9/11. Alsultany stated that Muslim women
who acted as informants of Muslim daily life often dubbed as “moderate Muslims” by the media,
promoted racism and Orientalism while serving as proof of false inclusiveness and
multiculturalism. The “good Muslim women” who denounced Islam and embraced Western
values became feminist heroes according to Alsultany.127
On a broader scale, Teun A. Van Dijk’s analysis showed that the mainstream news
media portrayed the minorities as “a problem or a threat, and are portrayed preferably in
association with crime, violence, conflict, unacceptable cultural differences, or other forms of
deviance.”128 Saifuddin Ahmed and Jorg Matthes’ meta-analysis of three-hundred and forty-five
studies demonstrated that Muslims were “negatively framed” and Islam had been portrayed as a
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violent religion.129 Ahmed and Matthes also argued that mass media’s articulation of “dominant
social values, ideologies, and developments” lead to minorities’ misrepresentation in the media.
130

Ahmed and Matthes’ analysis demonstrated that after 9/11, the Western news media started to

focus on Muslims and Islam and the portrayal was often negative, and similarly, the academic
studies mainly focused on the negative aspects and emphasized the link between Islam and
migration, war, conflict, and radicalism.131 Mohammad Samiei’s article “Neo-Orientalism? The
relationship between the West and Islam in our globalized world” shed light to Ahmed and
Matthes’ analysis by examining the changes in Orientalist dualism and neo-Orientalism.132
Samiei agreed with Ahmed and Matthes on how Islam became more mainstream in the West:
after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and added that the hostage crisis in Tehran and the
“unresolved Palestinian question” also contributed to the growing interest in Islam.133 Samiei
gave the example of portraying Islam as a homogenous enemy, and according to this model
Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the al-Qaeda had little difference between them.134
Mubarak Altwaiji stated that 9/11 and the following political changes in the world “Contributed
to the re-evolution of the classic Orient.”135 Altwaiji stated that the binary division that labeled
Muslims as “them” was employed with the “War on Terror” and the representations of Muslims
often portrayed as terrorists.136
A more recent study from 2013 by Fatemah Poorebrahim and Gholam Reza Zarei
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followed the consensus and argued that Islam was stereotyped and Muslims were negatively
represented in the Western news media.137 Poorebrahim and Zarei employed a linguistic approach
to examine the Muslims’ portrayal. Their argument was that the language used in the media did
not reflect the reality but it created the reality.138 Poorebrahim and Zarei employed Teun A. Van
Dijk’s argument that “Mental representations are often articulated along ‘US’ versus ‘THEM’
dimensions, in which speakers of one group will generally tend to present themselves or their
own group in positive terms, and other groups in negative terms.”139 The authors’ examination of
the Western media yielded the following results:
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Table 1. Orientalist Themes: Total Numbers and Percentages in the Independent, The Herald
Tribune, the Times, and the New York Times (NYT).140
Orientalist Theme

The
Independent
1
1
2
0
5
1

Inferiority
Backwardness
Irrationality
Submissiveness
Islam as threat
Christians/Jews v.
Muslims
Strangeness
0
Untrustworthiness
0
Total No. of Headlines 10

Herald
Tribune
0
2
3
0
4
1

The
Times
1
2
4
0
4
3

NYT % of
total
0
4.34
2
15.21
4
28.26
0
0
4
36.95
1
13.4

0
0
10

0
0
14

0
1
12

0
2.17

Table 2. Word Collocating with the Terms Islam and Muslims in the Selected Headlines.141
Words collocating
The
Herald
The
NYT
Total
Islam/Muslims
Independent
Tribune
Times
Radical
3
4
3
2
12
Corruption
1
0
0
1
2
Fundamentalist/ism
0
0
0
1
1
Terrorist/ism
2
2
3
2
9
Barbarity/Violent
2
0
1
1
4
Extremist/ism,
0
0
1
1
2
Fanaticism/ism
Kill/War
1
0
1
1
3
Threat/Fear
2
0
3
0
5
Dead/Death
0
1
0
2
3
Veil
1
1
1
0
3
Total
12
6
13
11
44
As demonstrated by Poorebrahim and Zarei’s data, Islam had been portrayed as the other, that
was often violent and backward in comparison to the Western culture. Poorebrahim and Zarei’s
findings demonstrated that Said’s arguments were still valid even after more than thirty years.
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In order to make sense of the news media portrayal of Islam and Muslims and the
favoritism of the Gulen movement as a progressive reform movement, it is practical to define the
historical progress of approaches to Islam and Muslims. It would be fair to say that while some
nuanced approaches were also employed in the news media towards Islam and Muslims when the
Gulen movement’s portrayal examined it becomes evident that both Orientalism and neoOrientalism were employed consistently by the journalists. In this section, I will define and
explain Orientalism, neo, and self-Orientalism before demonstrating how all three were employed
in the approaches of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal toward Islam and Muslims.
In 1978, Edward Said published one of his most famous works that is still considered one of the
essential texts of post-colonial studies, Orientalism. Said was the first person to formulate an
analysis of “the relationship between Orientalist constructions of the Orient and Western imperial
domination of that Orient.”142 After Said’s work garnered attention, and to some degree criticism,
two other concepts were defined by scholars in the coming years: neo-Orientalism, which is quite
similar to Orientalism, and self-Orientalism, which usually goes hand in hand with neoOrientalism.
Edward Said’s main argument in Orientalism dealt with the production of knowledge.
Said argued that the process of producing knowledge about the Orient was not objective or
accurate; it was simply a result of the Western view of the Orient. Said defined Orientalism as “a
style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction,” between the East and
the West.143 In most simple terms, the lens the West sees the geographic area labeled as the
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Orient was called Orientalism by Said.144 Edward Said stated in Orientalism that “Anyone who
teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient— and this applies whether the person is an
anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist— either in its specific or its general aspects,
is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism.”145 Said argued that there was no
“Orient” that was misrepresented by the Westerners, and stated that "the Orient" itself was a
constituted entity, and that “the notion that there were geographical spaces with indigenous,
radically "different" in-habitants who could be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or
racial essence proper to that geographical space was equally a highly debatable idea.”146 In
Orientalism, Said stated that the group of ideas about the “Orient” had no realness to them. In
short, he argued that there was no real “Orient.”147 In relation to this argument, he claimed that
Orientalism did not accurately represent the Orient [since it was impossible because the Orient
was a constructed reality by the Occident] but it was still “valuable as a sign of EuropeanAtlantic power over the Orient.”148 Said also stressed the constant status of the Occident in
relation to Orient in Orientalism.149 Said believed that the inferiority attributed to the Orient by
the Occident also served to construct the Occident’s superiority.150 Said stated that knowledge
was produced, and according to this, the Occident represented the civilization while the Orient
represented the uncivilized; the Occident was the main geographical area while the Orient was
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the surroundings; the Occident could modernize the Orient and could civilize it.151 Burc Aka and
Ensar Nisanci argued that the Occident defined the Orient as the surrounding other and as the
opposite of reason and virtues by putting itself in the center as the civilization.152 Fred Halliday
defined “Orientalism” as an approach to the Arab world “on some broad premises,” such as
language, Islam, and the lack of historical change.153 First of them is the language of the region,
specifically Arabic.154 Halliday argued that once an individual learned Arabic, he or she almost
immediately qualified to be an expert of the Arab world and even seen as someone who c
understand the “Arab mind.”155 The second premise, according to Halliday, was religion. Islam
was seen as an “independent variable, an explanatory factor.”156 Halliday pointed out that issues
explained in Encyclopedia of Islam as “The lack of entrepreneurial class, the frailty of
democracy, the hostility to Israel, the insecurity of boundaries, the apparent rejection of
modernization, the irrationality, cruelty, even terrorism characteristic of Middle East politics are
related to atemporal ‘Islam’ or, failing that, ‘the Arab Mind.”157 Finally, the third premise,
Halliday explained, was the lack of change. “[…] The difficulty or impossibility to change,
particularly when if this is seen to be in a direction more like the liberal, secular and in broad
terms rational democracies of the West.”158
While Said referred to the late eighteenth century as the starting point of Orientalism, the
origins of Orientalism can be traced back to the 14th Century when the Church Council of Vienna
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ordered university chairs to work collectively to “promote an understanding of oriental trade,
inter-religious rivalries and military conflict.”159 As Said pointed out, the first detailed studies of
the Orient were not published until the 18th and 19th centuries.160According to Bryan S. Turner, a
theology scholar at Birmingham University, the knowledge of Orient was a direct result of
European expansion towards the East.161 While the “Orient” is a geographical term that
constitutes the area from the East Mediterranean to Southeast Asia, “Islam,” Turner argued,
“played a peculiarly significant part in the formation of Western attitudes to the East.”162 Turner
argued that Orientalizing the Orient reduced it to a series of oversimplifications in order to make
it easily comprehensible for the Western audience. This trend had been criticized recently on the
same pages of the Wall Street Journal by Misha Euceph. In 2017, Euceph wrote about a
prominent stereotype Muslim women faced, head coverings became their sole identity, a sole
symbol of all Muslim women regardless of their stance on the headscarf. 163 A Muslim woman
from Queens, New York who wore a headscarf made out of the American flag had recently
become the face of all Muslim women, especially during the protests against the Trump
administration.164 Euceph argued that since there was not a homogenous consensus over the
headscarf’s place in Islam by Muslims and Islamic scholars, it was stereotyping to portray all
Muslim women in a single way. “People who do not personally know Muslims now associate
the religion with an article of clothing that is not universally representative,” Euceph remarked in
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“How Progressives Tokenize Hijab.”165
Edward Said’s Orientalism attracted its fair share of criticism in addition to great praise.
Most of the critics of Said’s work revolved around his vagueness when defining the Orient and
his approach to the Occident. Said mainly focused on the British and French view of the Orient
and left the rest of the Western world out. He was accused of committing “Orientalism in
reverse” since he was also overgeneralizing the West based on two former empires.166 Bernard
Lewis, who is considered a traditional neo-Orientalist, also pointed out that Said reduced the
Orient to the Middle East and only examined the British and French imperialism along with Fred
Halliday who also accused Said of representing the West as homogenous.167 Fred Halliday
focused on another aspect and pointed out the racism employed against the Orient was evident in
“about all subject peoples,” and the hostility towards Arabs or Muslims were not unique.168 Aijaz
Ahmad argued that Said could not deliver an answer to the question of whether Orientalism
misrepresented the Orient or that it was impossible to authentically represent the Orient.169 Said
stated that the main issue was “Whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or
whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first in the
language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer.”170 Which
Bruce Robbins responded, “If everything is a representation, then representation is not a scandal.
Or if all representation is a scandal, then no particular representation is particularly
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scandalous”171 Overall, none of the critiques of Said argued that Orientalism was not employed
when defining and explaining the region of the Orient, their criticism mainly dealt with Said’s
definition of the Occident and with the uniqueness of the Orientalism. None of Said’s critiques
discredited his claims.
The Orientalist question whether Islam and the West were compatible had been asked
repeatedly especially since the 1990s. Bernard Lewis, in his article “The Roots of Muslim Rage”,
argued that between the Muslims and the West there was “nothing less than a clash of
civilizations.”172 Samuel Huntington also developed his own argument supporting the idea of the
clash of civilizations. Ernest Renan said that in order to be understood “Islam […] should be
reduced to tent and tribe,” Huntington argued that “Islam has bloody borders,” and famously
Bernard Lewis penned an article entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” that argued all Muslims
were prone to violence.173 Different interpretations of Islam, cultures, beliefs, and practices in
addition to secular movements were all ignored in Orientalism.174 Meanwhile, experts such as
Fred Halliday and John L. Esposito were actively trying to debunk the myths surrounding Islam
and Muslims.175 Deepa Kumar, in 2010, argued that Islam became the “civilizational antithesis of
the ‘West.”176 Matthew F. Jacobs argued that Islam was interpreted as “monolithic, totalitarian
and inherently confrontational” in the early years of the Cold War.177 Salim Kerboua, on the other
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hand, argued that the original views behind Orientalism resurfaced as intensified after 9/11.
According to Kerboua, both Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington played major roles in
constructing neo-Orientalism where Muslims were perceived as violent in addition to being
backward and inferior in comparison to the Westerners.178 Neo-Orientalism was defined similarly
to its predecessor by Ali Behdad and Juliet Williams, “monolithic, totalizing, reliant on a binary
logic, and based on an assumption of moral and cultural superiority over the Oriental other.”179
Behdad and Williams pointed out a significant difference between Orientalism and neoOrientalism, while Orientalists tended to be white and European males, neo-Orientalists were
“rather Middle Eastern women and men who use their native subjectivity and new-found agency
in the West to render otherwise biased accounts of the region seemly more authoritative and
objective.”180 According to Behdad and Williams “A journalistic pretense of direct access to truth
and the real dominates the current form, as neo-Orientalists deploy superficial empirical
observations about Muslim societies and cultures to make great generalizations about them.”181
Avadhesh Kumar Singh defined neo-Orientalism as the “discourse about (sic) Orient by the
people of the Orient located in the West or shuttling between the two.”182 Mubarak Altwaiji
pointed out that Dag Tuastad employed the term neo-Orientalism when criticizing the American
“neo-colonial and neo-liberal agenda in the Middle East.”183 When George W. Bush described
the “War on Terror” as a crusade and when the First Lady, Laura Bush, pointed out that the same
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war was also “A fight for the rights and dignity of women” the neo-Orientalist approach was
employed.184
The main difference between Orientalism and neo-Orientalism is the difference of the
definition of the Orient. While both of them put the Occident in the center and define the Orient
over the Occident, in Orientalism the Occident is a geographical concept as in the “East of the
West.” In neo-Orientalism, the Orient is defined over identities such as Muslim, the Middle East,
or Islam.185 Neo-Orientalism emphasized that the Orient’s backwardness stems from their culture
rather the lack of modernization, which is another major difference between Orientalism and neoOrientalism. Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, and Robert Kaplan all argued that the
backwardness of the Muslim world was a direct result of the Islamic culture and the Muslim
mentality that was essentially prone to violence.186 Yahya Sadowski argued that neo-Orientalists,
unlike the Orientalists, attributed the backwardness of the Middle East to the tribal Islamic
mentality that did not accept modern political organizations.187 Another major significant
characteristic of neo-Orientalism is that it popularizes factually wrong notions about the
Orient.188 Neo-Orientalism employs the Orient’s own people to define the Orient. This is
sometimes called self-Orientalism, which was defined as “in a Western value system one’s selfexplaining/representing by corrupting the representation of one’s own culture.”189 Unlike
Orientalism, where the West is the actor and the East is the acted on, in self-Orientalism, it is the
Westernized Eastern acting upon the East. In both of these approaches, the Orient is always the
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object.190 Historically, self-Orientalism first mentioned by Antonio Chuffat Latour in 1927
referring to the representation of Chinese in “Apunte Histórico de los Chinos en Cuba”191 Unlike
Said’s argument that Orientalism was between the East and the West, self-Orientalism is solely
Eastern. The Orient’s elites who employ Western values upon themselves inevitably self-Orient
their own selves/cultures.192 Both Orientalism and neo-Orientalism essentialized the otherness of
Islam, and what is now called “new barbarism” by Dag Tuastad was a direct result of these two
Orientalisms. “New Barbarism,” according to Tuastad, was the way of representing Arabs and
Muslims in the Western media as if violence originated from their respective cultures while
omitting political and economic reasons of violence.193 It simply refers to the identification of
Muslims with violence; it is important for the neo-Orientalist view to emphasize this relation
between Muslims and violence in order to stress the cultural divide between the West and the
Orient.194 Overall, it would be fair to say that both Orientalism and neo-Orientalism employed an
approach to the Occident that portrayed its culture, religion and its people as backward,
monolithic, uncivilized, and violent. In addition to this portrayal, Islam often cited as the source
of these negative characteristics of the Orient.
The positive portrayal of the Gulen movement in the New York Times and in the Wall
Street Journal by portraying it as an apolitical and secular modernizing force for Islam, which
will be examined in detail in Chapter II, stemmed from Orientalism and neo-Orientalism. This
favoritism of the Gulen movement might have hindered the public opinion and foreign policies
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employed by the United States. Unlike its favorable portrayal, the Gulen movement is essentially
a highly political movement, where Gulen ties religion to national identity and civilization. It
aims to impose a sexist ideology that conforms traditional gender roles and imprisons women to
the domestic sphere in addition to strengthening the existing prejudices against the already
vulnerable LGBTQ+ communities in Muslim societies. Gulen movement has been imposing
outdated and factually wrong scientific knowledge to the public to further strengthen the religious
identity. In order to understand the positive portrayal of the Gulen movement of the New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal, it would be best to demonstrate the portrayal of Islam and
Islam-related news in both of these newspapers. As I mentioned above, the portrayal of Islam and
Muslim-majority societies had not changed drastically overtime from openly Orientalist, while
there were cultural relativist/multiculturalist and nuanced approaches to Muslims and Islam the
majority of the articles in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal still employed the
characteristics of Orientalism and neo-Orientalism.
While Islam and Muslim-majority societies were not paid much attention by these
newspapers during the 1980s, this changed with the new decade of 1990. As a result, the public
was subjected to more information about Islam and naturally more criticism of the problems that
were common in Muslim-majority societies. The trend, as demonstrated by the examined articles
in the following chapter, was that both of the largest newspapers in the United States by
circulation growingly became more critical of issues in Muslim-majority societies. The evidence
also suggests that this critical approach had not been applied to Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen
movement. The evidence demonstrates that regardless of the approach employed by the
newspaper, the Gulen movement, as a religiopolitical movement with an ideology that often
contradicts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, gained a certain favoritism and avoided
being criticized by the journalists of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. The
38

movement had been praised for providing a modern Islam that was compatible with the West and
the Western values in contrary to the evidence that demonstrates the nationalistic and the
fundamentalist nature of the movement. In order to paint a clear picture of how Islam, Muslim
societies, and problems that were common in Muslim- societies were portrayed and criticized in
the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal, I examined sixty articles that were published
between the years of 1985 and 2016.
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CHAPTER I: THE PERSISTENCE OF ORIENTALISM IN THE NEW YORK TIMES
AND IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL BETWEEN 1985 AND 2016
My examination of the articles that dealt with Muslims and problems often attributed to
Muslim societies demonstrates that a very prominent Orientalist approach progressively left its
place to a relatively more nuanced approach that still fits the definition of Orientalism and/or neoOrientalism in the case of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Since 1985, both of
the newspapers increasingly provided platforms to journalists from a variety of backgrounds to
employ their own point of views on matters of Muslim societies and Muslims. Especially the
New York Times’ journalist pool grew significantly more diverse after 9/11. However, journalists
with diverse backgrounds did not always mean more balanced or accurate representations of
Islam and Muslims. As stated above, one of the main characteristics of neo-Orientalism is
providing non-factual information about the Orient, and self-Orientalism where a member of the
Orient accept the cultural superiority of the West and misrepresent his or her own culture
accordingly.195 In the next two sections, I will examine Muslims’ portrayal in the New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal to demonstrate that the essentially Orientalist approach
persisted. The evidence also shows that these newspapers had never been reluctant to criticize or
point out the problems in Muslim societies while mostly sparing the Gulen movement.
This section thematically examines the articles published in the New York Times that
dealt with Islam, Muslims, Muslim minority and Muslim majority societies, starting with Judith
Miller’s article “Court Ruling on Wives Divides Egypt,” from 1985 until 2016 to demonstrate the
Orientalist and neo-Orientalist approaches that had been continuously employed by the New York
Times and the lack of criticism of the Gulen movement. While the journalists became more
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diversified in time and the tones of articles had changed from a more Western-centric to a less
polarizing one, the criticism towards the practices often identified with Muslim-majority societies
such as lack of women’s and LGBTQ+ rights actually became more prominent since 1985. For
instance, during the 1980s Islam was almost always related to the conflict in the New York Times
yet some social issues that took place in some Muslim-majority societies attracted attention as
well. When I searched the New York Times database for words “Islam” and “terrorism” it yielded
1,205 results for the years between 1985 and 2000 and 3,653 results for the years between 2001
and 2017. For example, in 1986, the Iranian Islamic regime was harshly criticized by the New
York Times. An editorial used the word “barbarous” describing the alleged persecution of the
Bahai minority by the regime. 196 The emphasis was on the “uncivilized vs. civilized” narrative. It
is clear that the portrayal had gotten varied over the decades and while Islamic extremism is still
a topic that gets published often, social lives of both the Muslim minority in the United States and
the Muslim-majority societies became frequent topics as well. In Do Muslim Women Need
Saving, Lila Abu-Lughod argued that the Western news media portrayed Muslim women in need
of Western help.197 Abu-Lughod examined the portrayal of Muslim women before and during the
invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and argued that the portrayal of Muslim women was
used to justify the Iraq War in 2003. When I examined thirty-four articles from the New York
Times that dealt with women’s rights issues in Muslim societies such as child marriage,
polygyny, and mandatory dress codes it became evident that until as recent as 2016 the
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journalists employed problematic approaches that fit the definition of Orientalism and/or neoOrientalism.
The first article I examined was Judith Miller’s piece from 1985. This article dealt with
the then-new court ruling that made it easier for Egyptian men to practice polygyny and the
reaction it caused among the liberal circles.198 Miller argued that the Egyptians who were afraid
to be labeled as anti-Islamists claimed that the Quran granted women more rights than Western
societies.199 Miller’s article tied the issues with gender equality in Egypt directly to the Quran and
as a result, she cited Islam as the cause for the gender inequality in the Egyptian society without
exploring any other possible reasons. Miller’s approach is the typical Orientalist approach, where
Islam is seen as a cause for uncivilized behavior and the reason for this backward practice.
Miller’s approach strengthens the “us vs. them” thesis by minimizing the social and historical
causes and scapegoating Islam for all kinds of unequal treatment of women in society.
Child marriage in Muslim-majority societies was a prominent theme in the 1980s for the
New York Times. An article from 1987 focused on the widespread practice of child marriage in
Nigeria, and two articles written by Barbara Crossette focused on the practice of child marriage
in Pakistan and India.200 All three of these articles pointed out the negative consequences of early
marriages that were often forced upon the young girls by their families. Crossette pointed out the
Islamic influence over formerly Hindu Rajasthan, India, indicating that the child brides were a
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consequence of Islam. James Brookes also stressed that the child bride he was writing about was
a Muslim and that Nigeria was a Muslim-majority country.201 According to the datum provided
by the non-governmental organization Girls Not Brides: The Global Partnership to End Child
Marriage, predominantly Christian Central African Republic was following the predominantly
Muslim Niger in child marriages.202 According to the same datum, Brazil, Mexico, the U.S.,
Ukraine, Thailand, Bhutan, and Vietnam were the other countries where child marriages took
place frequently. As suggested by this evidence, portraying Islam as the cause for the issue of
child marriage is both oversimplifying vastly diverse Muslim societies and enforce the “civilized
vs. uncivilized” narrative. In twenty-five states in America, there is no minimum age for
marriage, yet all three of these articles framed the issue as an Islamic problem rather than a
world-wide and cross-cultural one.203
Henry Kamm’s article from 1988 about the women’s future in Afghanistan after the
Soviet-Afghan war aimed to paint an optimistic picture for the Afghan women. For his article,
Kamm interviewed Masooma Esmatee Wardak, who was the president of the Women’s Council
of Afghanistan. Wardak emphasized the worries of Afghan women regarding the possibility of
fundamentalists gaining control and eliminating the women’s rights. When Kamm quoted
Wardak’s optimistic outlook for the future he also pointed out her year-long education in
National College of Education in Evanston, Illinois, where she learned most of her English skills
according to Kamm.204 By pointing out Wardak’s education in the U.S., Kamm indicated her
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Westernized status. Another article from 1989 written by Barbara Crossette recounted women’s
struggle for greater rights in Pakistan and pointed out the inferior status of women to men. The
article especially highlighted an activist woman’s plea for legal help to a woman whose husband
did not permit her to get a mastectomy even though she had breast cancer.205 While there is no
way to fact check this claim, the journalist’s decision to include it to her article contributed to the
“oppressed Muslim woman in need” narrative. Crossette also stated that gender inequality in
Pakistan derived from economic disadvantages, tribal societies, and from Islam.206 Judith Miller’s
article from 1992 reported the growingly oppressive practices in Muslim countries. Miller told
the story of an Algerian businesswoman whose child cousin refused to kiss her goodnight since
he was told by a teacher that it was haram to kiss women.207 In this article, Miller quoted Gilles
Kepel, an Orientalist French expert on Islamic extremism:
What we're seeing is the re-Islamization of the entire region, the alteration of basic
patterns of life. Europe is not immune. In my neighborhood in Paris, I used to see one
veiled woman a week. Now I see five a day.208
Miller pointed out the oppression of women by the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, and other
abuses of women’s rights in Sudan, and Egypt.209 Miller also quoted Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, an
Egyptian political scientist, who argued that Arabs cannot be democratic since they understood it
as the ruling of the majority without any concern over minority rights.210 Miller’s article
employed neo-Orientalist approach and Dessouki’s comments could be considered selfOrientalism, where the Oriental accepted the Western superiority and misrepresented her/his
own.
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Barbara Crossette pointed out the exclusion of women from public life in Afghanistan
under the Taliban rule where women were forced to quit their jobs at the United Nations. The
article also pointed out the problems with the girls’ education under the Taliban rule. Crossette
identified the Taliban as “conservative Islamic councils” in the first line of her article instead of
pointing out the radical nature of the organization.211 This overgeneralization falsely indicated
that all conservative Muslims support extremely sexist acts and ideas of Taliban that still targets
women to this day. A news article from 1995, “Islamic Dress Code Deaths,” reported the murder
of three women in Turkey. A mother and daughter were slain in the Black Sea region of Turkey
by their family members allegedly for “dressing revealingly.”212 This brief article labeled the
motives of the murderers as the “Islamic dress code,” while there is no consensus on the
supposed “Islamic dress code.”213 Oversimplifying a much-debated subject in a sentence fits the
definition of the Orientalism as well. Marlise Simon’s article from 1998 focused on the women’s
rights abuses in Morocco where polygyny was legal and honor-based violence was prevalent
according to the article. Women’s status was criticized throughout the article and Simon stated
that “[Polygyny and honor-based violence] are common -- and not just in Morocco, which likes
to see itself as one of the more cultured and humane lands among Arab nations.”214 Simon’s
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approach indicated that Morocco was one of the civilized nations in the Arab world and yet still
could not achieve a Western level civilization while also indicating that other Arab nations were
less cultured and less humane. Elaine Sciolino wrote in 2000 on the strict Iranian dress code and
examined the allowed dress colors for young female pupils in schools. According to this article,
girls who were younger than nine did not have to comply with the dress code in public but must
so in state-run schools. The article featured an image of a group of female children wearing
chadors where the subtitle read: “In Tehran, 9-year-olds celebrate their duties as young Islamic
girls.”215 Sciolino’s approach indicates her Orientalism since she specifically referred to chador
as “Islamic dress.” Again, there is no consensus on the “Islamic dress code” among Muslims and
scholars, in the case of Sciolino’s article it was the Iranian government who enforced this dress
code.
In 2001, Susan Sachs wrote about women’s status in Muslim majority societies that
echoed the reports from the previous decade. Sachs’ article, entitled “Islam preaches equality, yet
in most Muslim countries a woman’s place is determined by a man’s will. It’s the law,” failed to
recognize that gender inequality was not, and still is not, a direct cause of Islam nor it was unique
to Muslim societies.216 “For Many Turks, Head Scarf's Return Aids Religion and Democracy”
published in 2008, written by Sabrina Tavernise and Sebnem Arsu. The article opened with a
question whether or not lifting the ban on headscarf was eroding secularism in Turkey and then
continued “But in Turkey, looks are often deceiving. A majority of Turks see the measure —
submitted Tuesday to Parliament, where it is expected to pass — as good for both religion and
215

Elaine Sciolino, “The World: Iranian Dress Code; Here and There, a Burst of Color Is Now Islamic,” New York
Times, July 23, 2000, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/23/weekinreview/theworld-iranian-dress-code-here-and-there-a-burst-of-color-is-now-islamic.html.
216
Susan Sachs, “Where Muslim Traditions Meet Modernity,” New York Times, December 19, 2001, accessed
December 6, 2017,
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20011219wednesday.html.

46

democracy.”217 Tavernise and Arsu provided data from a survey where the majority of the
sampled Turks considered themselves as “very/extremely religious.” Tavernise and Arsu used
this data to demonstrate that the majority supported the lift of the headscarf ban. Yet, one can be
extremely religious and not favor the headscarf or vice versa. The portrayal of a debatable topic
as “good for religion” fits the definition of Orientalism, and neo-Orientalism since Sebnem Arsu
is Turkish. The journalists overgeneralized the Turks who favored the lift of the headscarf ban
and the Muslims who identified as religious and in Arsu’s case misrepresented the reality without
any solid evidence. In an article written on a 9-year-old Yemeni child bride who sought divorce
in 2008, journalist Robert F. Worth stressed the role of conservative Islam in child marriages
both in Yemen and Afghanistan.218 As I mentioned above, child marriages cannot be considered
unique to Muslim societies, and Islam could not be considered the cause for them since there are
many Muslim societies that do not practice child marriage.
A 2016 op-ed “How Islam Can Fight the Patriarchy” by Riada Asimovic Akyol credited
Islamist women of Turkey for the withdrawal of a bill known as the “child rape bill,” that was
aimed to retrospectively pardon any statutory rapist of a female victim if the perpetrator agreed to
marry the victim.219 Asimovic Akyol stated that the bill was withdrawn because of the outrage it
caused among the Islamist women.220 Asimovic Akyol’s claim about the reason for the
withdrawal of the bill portrayed the protesters’ position as “progressive.” Yet, the bill was only
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proposed and the Turkish Civil Law states that no one could marry, under no circumstances,
before the age of sixteen, and the normal minimum marriage age is seventeen.221 Since the
protesters were supporting the law should be preserved as it was, it would be impossible to talk
about a progressive position. Asimovic Akyol stated that using “Islamic arguments” may be
helpful to stop child marriages justified based on Islam around the world. Asimovic Akyol’s
opinion piece indicated that child marriages were a problem unique to Muslim societies. Hence
this article could be considered Orientalist and even self-Orientalist for misrepresenting the
position of the law-makers and the protestors while overgeneralizing the protestors’ identity as
“Islamic.” Diaa Hadid, an observant Muslim journalist, recounted her own experience in “At the
Hajj, Facing Islam's Inconsistent Embrace of Women” that was published in 2016. While she did
not mention the spiritual side of her journey, her article focused on the second-class status of
women in Saudi Arabia that all Muslim women had to endure if they wanted to practice
pilgrimage to the Muslim holy land Mecca.222 Hadid’s article stood out from the majority of
articles that are examined here since she provided her own experiences in a non-secular country.
Hadid’s article was a great example of self-Orientalism; she attributed the Saudi Arabian dress
code to Islam by stating that “[She] was at once frustrated by Islam’s nitpicky strictures on
women’s dress.”223
Hostility toward the LGBTQ+ communities in the Muslim and Muslim-majority
societies and communities also attracted some attention by the New York Times. Since Fethullah
Gulen and the Gulen movement are both hostile to the LGBTQ+ community it was striking to
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find articles that emphasized “Islam’s hostility” towards the LGBTQ+ communities while none
of the New York Times articles pointed out Gulen’s homophobia. Susan Sachs penned an article
in 1999 and explained the spiritual and personal struggles of young Muslim gay men in the
United States. The young gay activists pointed out that it was impossible for them to convince a
Muslim community leader, imam or a political leader to speak at their events while Sachs
stressed the fact that homosexuality was illegal in most of the Muslim-majority countries. While
this is correct, there are also Muslim-majority countries such as Jordan and Turkey where
homosexuality is legal, and discrimination based on sexual orientation is outlawed.224 Sachs’
approach could be considered Orientalist since she overgeneralized Muslims for being hostile to
the LGBTQ+ communities and cited Islam as the reason for this hatred. Robert F. Worth wrote
about the challenges the Muslim LGBTQ+ individuals faced in 2002. Worth pointed out that in
most Islamic societies homosexuality was a crime “punishable in some cases by death.”225
Worth’s report was accurate, yet it also pointed out that Al-Fatiha, a Muslim LGBTQ+ group
founded by gay Muslims, and an unnamed imam from a liberal New York City Mosque did not
consider homosexuality as a sin. This proves that hostility against the LGBTQ+ community
cannot be considered a direct result of religion. Worth’s approach fits the definition of
Orientalism since he portrayed Islam as a monolithic religion as his article suggested that the
hostility towards the LGBTQ+ community was also monolithic. A Neil MacFarquhar article
“Gay Muslims Find Freedom, of a Sort, in the U.S.” quoted a gay Muslim man:
They're afraid of the rest of the community here,'' said Ayman, a stocky 31year-old from Jordan, who won asylum in the United States last year on the
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basis of his sexuality. ''It's such a big wrong in the Koran that it is impossible to
be accepted.226
Again, since this article portrayed Islam as the sole reason for the hostility against the LGBTQ+
communities it committed Orientalism and even self-Orientalism. As other articles that were
published in the New York Times reported, there were and still are Muslim LGBTQ+
organizations. It would simply be committing Orientalism to overgeneralize almost two-billion
people from different cultures with different point of views.
Similar to the LGBTQ+ issues, creationism was another current issue the New York
Times paid attention in the recent years that is a non-issue when it comes to the Gulen movement.
While the Gulen movement claims that they support modern scientific education in their schools,
Fethullah Gulen wrote materials aimed to discredit the theory of evolution and he repeatedly
stated that he did not believe in evolution. In 2007, Cornelia Dean wrote about Harun Yahya and
his controversial self-published book Atlas of Creation in the New York Times. Dean interviewed
a group of scholars who received the book in the mail unsolicited and the article concluded that
Yahya’s book mostly consisted of unscientific claims.227 Kenneth Chang reported that
creationism was common among Muslims and it was a worrisome trend since it indicated a slow
scientific progress in these communities or nations in “Creationism, Minus a Young Earth,
Emerges in the Islamic World” written in 2009.228 Both Dean’s and Chang’s articles
demonstrated the double standards applied to the Gulen movement.
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It would be unfair to leave out the examples of articles where the journalists approached
their subject matters without employing the characteristics of Orientalism. The sample of
articles here also demonstrated that even though the New York Times employed non-Orientalist
approaches to the issues of Muslims and Muslim-majority societies, they also did not publish
articles that pointed out the same issues with the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen. Seth
Mydans’ article from 1996, stated that the Malaysian women’s rights activists attributed the
inequality of women to men rather than Islam while the article recognized the secondary status
of women in Malaysia.229 Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement’s support of gender
inequality was, on the contrary, misrepresented in the New York Times.230 None of the articles
that were published in the New York Times referenced to Fethullah Gulen’s article where he
instructed his followers on the particulars of physically assaulting their wives.231 Neil
MacFarquhar’s article from 2001 about an Egyptian trial, where fifty-two men were tried for
suspicion of homosexual activity, pointed out that while homosexuality was not illegal in Egypt
the justice system was corrupt enough to try people based on charges that did not exist in the
law.232 MacFarquhar’s article was nuanced but when the reports on Gulen are considered this
article unfairly targeted the Egyptian individuals who did not condone homosexuality,
especially since Gulen holds similar beliefs to quoted Egyptians in this article. As stated by

229

Seth Mydans, “Blame Men, Not Allah, Islamic Feminists Say,” New York Times, October 10, 1996, accessed
September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/10/world/blame-men-not-allah-islamic-feministssay.html.
230
Tim Arango, “After a Break, Turkey's Prime Minister Again Courts Controversy,” New York Times, November
8, 2013, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/world/europe/turkey-coeddormitories-.html.
231
Fethullah Gulen, “Peygamber Efendimizin Kadınları Dövme Tavsiyesi Nasıl Değerlendirmelidir?,”
Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, July 12, 2007, accessed September 6, 2018, https://fGulen.com/tr/fethullah-Guleninbutun-eserleri/iman/fethullah-Gulen-asrin-getirdigi-tereddutler/582-fethullah-Gulen-peygamber-efendimizinkadinlari-dovme-tavsiyesi-nasil-degerlendirmelidir.
232
Neil MacFarquhar, “Egypt Tries 52 Men Suspected of Being Gay,” New York Times, July 19, 2001. accessed
September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/19/world/egypt-tries-52-men-suspected-of-being-gay.html

51

Tore Fougner “[Gulen] argues that ‘feminized men’ and ‘masculinized women’ are the devil’s
work.”233 Somini Sengupta’s article on the Pope Francis’ African visit in 2015 stressed that he
did not mention the issue of child marriage, condom use, violence against the LGBTQ+
community, or the high maternal death rate that were prevalent in Africa during his visit to a
mosque which was the final destination of his trip.234 This article is significant because it
showed the issues worth criticizing by the New York Times but when it comes to the Gulen
movement none of these issues were even mentioned.
Other articles that were published in the New York Times between 1985 and 2016 and
did not employ the Orientalist approach were “Respecting Muslim Patients’ Needs” from 2010,
reported about practicing Muslims who refused the services of medical doctors from opposite
genders.235 “Muslim Boys at a Swiss School Must Shake Teachers’ Hands, Even Female Ones”
from 2016 where both sides’ point of views reported objectively.236 Mujib Mashal’s 2016 article
recounted the short life of Zahra, an Afghan minor who endured abuse in her marriage and
eventually was set on fire while pregnant to her first child. When Zahra’s father claimed that it
was acceptable to marry young children because it was conducted by the prophet Mohammad,
Mashal explained the difference between tradition and religion rather than citing Islam as the
cause for child marriages.237
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As demonstrated by the examination of the thirty-four articles above, different
journalists with different backgrounds and expertise wrote about problems in Muslim societies in
the New York Times over a period of thirty-two years. While it is evident that there were articles
that did not employ Orientalism when dealing with Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam, the
majority of the articles that were published in the New York Times could be considered
Orientalist or neo-Orientalist. One of the most common characteristics of Orientalism that was
prominent in these articles were the overgeneralization of Muslims and the portrayal of Islam as a
monolithic source of negative things. In addition, the perceived resistance to change of Muslim
societies were also emphasized by the journalists. It is especially important to emphasize that
many practices that had drawn the attention of the New York Times journalists were completely
ignored when done or encouraged by the Gulen movement of by Gulen himself. Child marriage,
women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, violence against women, inter-religious tolerance, and access to
modern education were the main topics that were ignored by the New York Times when it came to
the Gulen movement.
When the Wall Street Journal articles that dealt with Islam, Muslims, Muslim minority
and Muslim majority societies, starting with Karen Elliot House’s article “The West Will Remain
Hostage” from 1985, thematically examined, they demonstrate that the Orientalist and neoOrientalist approaches had been continuously employed by the Wall Street Journal and the lack
of criticism of the Gulen movement. Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal
ignored the issues of child marriage, women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, violence against women,
inter-religious tolerance, and access to modern education when it came to the Gulen movement.
The Wall Street Journal featured a news piece entitled “The West Will Remain Hostage” written
by Karen Elliot House, the foreign editor in 1985, only six days after the hijack of TWA Flight
847. When Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad militants hijacked TWA Flight 847 to seek the release of
53

more than five hundred Muslims from Israeli custody.238 The passengers were physically harmed,
killed, and terrorized during the incident by the militants.239 Elliot House explained:
And it's this basic, almost primitive, fact of political life -- rulers constantly worrying
about their own physical survival -- that largely explains why the Middle East is likely to
remain paralyzed. In the Mideast, terrorists don't simply hold hostages, terrorism holds
the region and its rulers hostage.
Elliot House also quoted the neo-Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis, she mentioned the lack of
“free exchange of opinion,” in the Arab countries, she predicted that the Middle East would
“remain a slaughterhouse for America and her friends for years to come,” and argued that
America was a hostage to radical Islam as it was five years ago when America was taken hostage
by “the ayatollah's Islamic zealots.”240 Elliot House also explained the pre-radical Islam Middle
East by stating that “[…] The modern Mideast was a turbulent and violent part of the world
before what is now called radical Islam reared its head.”241 Elliot House, by arguing that the
Middle East and the Arab states were prone to violence by nature clearly employed Orientalism
by not examining the reasons behind Islamic terrorism.
Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal also published articles that dealt
with issues other than violence. Metin Demirsar and Brent Bowers wrote in 1985 that most
women who were holding high ranks in the Turkish business world thought feminism was
irrelevant and that they were opposed to gender equality. It was noted that this negative sentiment
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of businesswomen was shared by their male colleagues as well.242 Demirsar and Bowers
explained how gender was limiting Turkish women by stating that “Modern Turkey seems
prepared to let [women] pursue their ambitions, so long as they follow the ancient sexual rules
off the job.”243 This article, while pointing out differing views, could still be considered
Orientalist. The authors overgeneralized the male business people’s opinion by asking only two
people of their opinions, and only six women; in contrast providing only one different point of
view from a sociologist, Mubeccel Kiray.244 In the article, the devoutly religious past of Turkey
was emphasized as well. Barbara Rosewicz reported in 1987 that Al Azhar, the oldest and the
most prestigious Islamic institution according to Rosewicz, “[…] explain ways in which
moderate, mostly pro-Western governments use Islam today,” in “Prestigious Al Azhar Is a Force
for Moderation.”245 In addition to this claim, Rosewicz pointed out the not-so-Western practices
of Al Azhar, such as its barefoot students and the grand sheik's belief of women who dyed their
hair "are doomed to hell and a bad destiny."246 Rosewicz referred to the institution as the “hotbed
of moderate Islam,” and emphasized that the institution “hasn't changed much in 1,000 years.”247
Rosewicz’s approach fits the characteristics of Orientalism since she emphasized the resistance to
change of the institution and non-Western characteristics to strengthen the “us vs. them”
narrative. Mary Williams Walsh’s article on the abstinence of women from the public sphere in
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Pakistan was supported with reports on violence against woman in the country.248 While Willams
Walsh noted that tradition also played a role in the widespread gender inequality and the violence
against women, she also referred to Pakistan as the “land of arranged marriages” and cited the
“Islamization” policies of the former president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq as a reason behind gender
inequality.249 Williams Walsh’s overgeneralization of Pakistan as the “land of arranged
marriages” and her claim that Islamization was the cause of systematic violence against women
indicates her Orientalist approach. Another article from 1988 reported the growing number of in
vitro fertilization clinics in Egypt and attributed the rapidly growing numbers to the complicated
and often controversial place of adoption in Islam.250 In this article, Islam was cited as the sole
reason for the growing number of in vitro fertilization clinics, and the general hostility towards
adoption. Geraldine Brooks reported that the state-sanctioned oppression of women in Saudi
Arabia in 1989 by stating that “Islam rules here.”251 Brooks quoted Don Kerr from London
Institute for Strategic Studies when explaining the lack of Westernization of the country “When it
came to things that are really important, they operate on the same basis they have always
done.”252 Brooks demonstrated the slow change in the Saudi Arabian society as the following:
But lest outsiders think nothing changes in Saudi Arabia, Mrs. al-Ammari, who is a
member of a 10-woman consortium running a computer-training business, tells a story:
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Just a generation ago, her mother was kidnapped and sold to a man who became her
husband. At the age of eight, it was her second wedding. She had already been married
once by family arrangement.253
It is evident that Brooks’ article pointed Islam out as the source of women’s oppression in Saudi
Arabia while the oppressive measures were enacted by the state. At the same time the article
emphasized the Orient’s resistance to change by pointing out Mrs. al-Ammari’s mother’s
marriage that happened when she was a child, a practice that would be considered unacceptable
in a Western culture, while strengthening the “us vs. them” narrative.
Peter Waldman’s report “Man Eyes Woman, She Smiles Back; This Is a Good Date? --Kuwait Is Bribing Its Youth To Marry and Have Babies; But Singles Don't Buy In” examined the
dating culture in Kuwait right after the Iraqi occupation in 1990.254 Waldman’s article focused on
gender inequality in Kuwait, legal polygyny and interfamily sexual relations where cousins were
encouraged to marry each other by their family members. Waldman stated that Kuwait was torn
between the West and Islam and argued that the Kuwaiti national identity was underdeveloped
“The Iraqi invasion awakened Kuwait to what it meant to be Kuwaiti: not much, except lots of
money.”255 The Orientalist approach was evident in Waldman’s article, he oversimplified the
Kuwaiti identity, emphasizing the “us vs. them” narrative by stating that the country is torn
between the Quran and the West. Finally, Waldman concluded his piece with a North Carolinian
woman’s words. Denise, who married a Kuwaiti man ten years earlier, was quoted saying "Some
Kuwaitis who bring home wives from abroad turn into super-Arab demons. […] One guy won't
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even let his wife talk about wearing pants, but then he goes around in shorts." The article
continued:
Denise and her husband have an unspoken pact. She keeps her American friends,
especially the soldiers, away from her sisters-in-law. And he keeps his relatives away
from their three daughters. "I don't want any of those cousins eying them -- no way!"
Denise says. "My little girls are going to grow up to be doctors."256
The article contributed to the “violent Arab male” narrative with these previous quotations.
Tony Horwitz reported in 1991 that “Western-style democracy is unthinkable” in Saudi
Arabia and explained that “Adulterers are stoned to death and murderers beheaded at a place
known to foreigners as "Chop Square” in Saudi Arabia.”257 According to Horwitz’s article, the
previous year a criminal’s dead body was left on view for the public after he was decapitated.258
Horwitz’s article emphasized the difference between the “Occident” and the “Orient” by stating
how a “Western-style” democracy was impossible because of certain punishment practices. In
1999 Steve Liesman reported the driving ban for women in Saudi Arabia. Liesman’s article
concluded with a Saudi woman’s remarks where she listed the dress code and the driving ban as
the two hardest things about living in Saudi Arabia.259 “Change comes slowly in a nation where
modernism and traditionalism have always been in conflict. This is, after all, the world's center of
Islam […]” Liesman stated, indicating this Muslim nation’s resistance to change.260
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Michael M. Phillip’s article “Muslim Nations, Vatican Oppose U.N. Declaration on
AIDS,” from 2001, dealt with the disagreement between “Canada, Australia, the EU and many
Latin American countries” and Vatican and Muslim countries over identifying risky groups which
were vulnerable to AIDS. “[…] and particularly whether to include men who have sex with men,
people who have multiple sex partners, sex workers, and their clients, injecting drug users and
their sexual partners" explained Phillip.261 Phillip referred to Iran, Egypt, and Syria as “Middle
Eastern nations” and “Muslim nations,” while leaving out the other eighteen Middle Eastern
nations and, forty-six countries that are Muslim majority countries. Phillip clearly employed
Orientalism in this article since he overgeneralized the Muslim majority nations and simply
referred to three specific countries as “Muslim nations,” and the “Middle Eastern nations.” It is
worth stressing that Fethullah Gulen, who also stated that HIV and AIDS were diseases that least
affected Muslims because “The noble values and morality of the Islamic way of life have
protected Muslims against such a disaster […]” was never criticized for his point of view by the
Wall Street Journal.262
In “What Muslim Women Want,” written by Geneive Abdo and Dalia Mogahed from
the Center for Muslim Studies at the Gallup Organization, claimed that majority of Muslim
women from twenty-two predominantly Muslim countries wanted their country’s laws to be
based on the Sharia law according to Gallup surveys in 2006.263 Abdo and Mogahed argued that
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“embracing Islam” was “expressed by wearing the hijab,” dismissed Turkish women’s views by
stating that “In nearly every country surveyed, aside from officially secular Turkey, a majority of
women say Islamic law should either be the primary source of legislation or a source.” Abdo and
Mogahed’s article employed an Orientalist approach because the Muslim women were
overgeneralized along with the definition of Muslim, the authors indicated that embracing Islam
was only possible by wearing the hijab.264
Unlike the New York Times, in the Wall Street Journal, the lines between women’s
rights and Muslims’ violent tendencies were blurred at times. For example, Peter Waldman noted
in 1994 that under the Iranian civil law, women were not equal to men especially when it came to
divorce.265 Waldman stated that “The religiously privileged -- in this case, males -- make out like
bandits.” While Waldman stated that Islam was not the problem, the article repeatedly referred to
the Sharia Law as the sole cause of gender inequality in Iran.266 Waldman’s article repeatedly
stated that even violence against women was not seen as a legitimate reason for divorce; while
the articles on the Gulen movement looked the other way on the same issue. Fethullah Gulen
stated that while the divorce was allowed in Islam, it is one of the worst acts a person could
commit that was not considered a sin.267 Another article published on the official website of
Gulen, fGulen.com, explained that when Gulen stated that women who did not have kids would
have been allowed to divorce their husbands if their husband was committing violent acts against
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them but he did not mean a simple slap on the face.268 The author of this article, Ahmet Kurucan,
explained that, while it was not condoned, husband’s slapping of his wife cannot be considered a
legitimate reason for divorce since it was a common and understandable occurrence in the heat of
arguments.269 Daniel Pearl wrote about the oppression on the social life in Iran and the young
people who were actively trying to flee to the United States as a result of the strict governmental
control over their social lives in 1996.270 Pearl cited the Islamic regime of Iran for the social
oppression of Iranians, while not acknowledging that the Iranian regime had a peculiar way of
interpreting Islam. Naomi Schaefer Riley wrote in 2006 that “Polygamy today is most popular in
cultures that are relatively backward and impoverished,” and cited Malaysia, Uganda, and Turkey
as examples of these cultures where polygyny was practiced. Schaefer Riley stated that Bernard
Accoyer, a French politician, cited the widely common practice of polygyny among the Muslim
minority in French as one of the main reasons for the then-recent riots in Paris. Schaefer Riley
agreed with this argument by pointing out the outcomes of systematic polygyny: families living
in poverty and young men with not much to do while recognizing that Accoyer was denounced
for racism.271 Schaefer Riley’s article was openly Orientalist, she referred to two Muslimmajority and one African country as “backward,” while she referred to the same practice in the
Netherlands as the “social habits of the Dutch.”272 Matt Bradley’s article from 2013 was on
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Khaled Abdullah, an Egyptian tele-preacher who supported marital rape, who was also against
LGBTQ+ rights and atheists. Bradley wrote:
The Salafi TV preachers advocate restrictive views on women, railing against female
protesters and even advising audiences of what they see as the Islamically correct way for
a husband to beat his wife.273
Bradley’s article did not employ an Orientalist approach, he did not overgeneralize all Egyptians
but rather pointed out an alarming new trend. However, this article demonstrates the positive
portrayal of Gulen since Gulen is also openly advising on how to beat women. Bradley’s article
referred to Abdullah as a Salafi, which he explained is “an austere practice of Islam that seeks to
imitate the lifestyle, and even dress, of the Prophet Muhammad and early Muslims” while Gulen
has been referred as a moderate by the Wall Street Journal.274
Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal also reported on LGBTQ+ rights
in Muslim societies. Sara Schonhardt penned “Indonesia's Gays Face a Backlash After
Advancing” in 2016 examined the human rights abuses against the homosexual men in Indonesia
and pointed out that “Homosexuality is not illegal similar to many Arab countries but the
LGBTQ+ individuals still face harassment and human rights abuses.”275 This is another nuanced
article where the author did not employ the Orientalist approach, but it demonstrates the positive
portrayal of Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement since both known for their hostility against
the LGBTQ+ communities, yet, this side of the Gulen movement had never been acknowledged
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by the Wall Street Journal.276 “Terror in Orlando: A Punitive Line on Homosexuality,” written by
Karen Leigh and Asa Fitch, harshly criticized the majority of Muslims’ stance towards
homosexuality around the world.277 The article argued that even the most liberal Arab nations
were hostile to the LGBTQ+ communities, and at least in ten Muslim majority countries
homosexuality was punishable by death.278 Leigh and Fitch did not mention the non-Muslim
majority countries that had hostile laws against the LGBTQ+ communities such as Russia and
Lithuania and countries that recently criminalized same-sex relations between women such as
Zambia and Tanzania.279 Leigh and Fitch’s approach fits the definition of Orientalism since they
overgeneralized Muslims as hostile to LGBTQ+ communities, treated Islam as a monolithic
entity that was the cause of this hostility, and emphasized the civilized vs. uncivilized narrative
by pointing out the hostility against the LGBTQ+ communities in Arab states.
Radical Islam was another prominent subject that was reported by the Wall Street
Journal. Thomas Kamm’s article from 1995 examined the branches of moderate and radical
Islam in France.280 While Kamm’s article was balanced in portraying differing opinions on Islam
and Muslims it also failed to acknowledge the secular Muslims living in France. The article
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deducted diverse interpretations of Islam into “radical” or “moderate.” Overgeneralization of
French Muslims indicated Kamm’s Orientalist approach. M. Zuhdi Jasser, an American-Muslim
military man, penned the article “The Islamist Threat Inside Our Military” that was published in
2011 pointed out “the ideological struggle between Americanism and Islamism.”281 Jasser’s selfOrientalist approach was evident in his article, he portrayed Islam as a monolithic religion and
argued that one cannot be loyal to the United States, a secular country, and to “The Ummah
(Muslim nation.)”282
Faisal Shahzad, the confessed Times Square bomber, stated to the judge at his
arraignment, "We Muslims are one community. We are not divided." He proclaimed that
he was a "mujahid" or a "Muslim soldier." Nidal Hasan similarly called himself a "Soldier
of Allah." This self-identification is central to the Islamist threat.
While Jasser emphasized that there were many secular Muslim leaders and many Muslim
servicemen and women who were serving in the military honorably, the article indicated that
there were only two branches of Islam: the one aligns with the West and the one that is the enemy
of it.283 Salam Al-Marayati and Maher Hathout voiced their opinion on the question if Islam
needed to reform in “Let Islamic Reform Start in America” published in 2014.284 Al-Marayati
and Hathout’s article opened with Bernard Lewis’s claim of a possibility of the Westernized
Muslims helping the Middle East on issues regarding minority rights and secularization.
“American Muslims have the freedom and the intellectual capacity to create positive change for
Islamic reform,” argued Al-Marayati and Hathout in their evidently neo-Orientalist article.285
This article overgeneralized non-American Muslims portrayed them as an uncivilized group that
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needed to be civilized by the Westernized American Muslims and represented Islam as
monolithic.
Andrew Higgins’ 2009 article on Adnan Oktar, a famous creationist and an eccentric TV
personality, drawn attention to the growing tendency to accept creationism among the educated
Turkish youth. Higgins quoted Aykut Kence, a scholar from the Biology department of the
Middle Eastern Technical University, “If people can't accept Darwin, they can't accept science.
They can't think," stated Kence.286 Higgins stated that Oktar had relations with the Vatican and
that creationism was mostly a Christian idea which was imported to Turkey.287 The same issue
had been previously examined in the Wall Street Journal by Daniel Golden in 2002, and it was
evident that the newspaper had no reservations in criticizing the creationist movement.288 These
two articles demonstrate the positive portrayal of Gulen since not a single article in the Wall
Street Journal, out of one hundred and seventy-three, pointed out the fact that Gulen is a
creationist.
Again, similar to the New York Times, not all articles in the Wall Street Journal employed
Orientalism when dealing with Muslims. In 2000, Geraldine Brooks wrote about the lack of
women’s sports in Muslim-majority nations such as Iran and Bahrain and how athletes were
struggling to flourish under very strict rules against women’s participation in sports.289 “In many
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conservative Muslim Gulf countries, women's sports don't exist,” stated Brooks, “[Bahrain] has
been quicker to accept wider women's roles than its neighbors,” explained further.290 Brooks’
article clearly stated that every Muslim country was different when it came to allowing women to
play sports and did not cite Islam as the cause of the inequality in sports. Said Summer and Ellen
Knickmeyer wrote in 2012 that the Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud appointed a
moderate cleric as the head of the country’s moral police. The newly appointed Sheik Abdulatif
al-Sheikh supported greater rights to women and vehemently opposed child marriage according
to the report.291 Summer and Knickmeyer repeatedly pointed out that the Saudi reformers were
hoping that Sheik Abdulatif al-Sheikh would enforce a different interpretation of the Islamic
Law, indicating that there were Islamic Laws and not a single interpretation.
A close examination of the sixty articles above from the New York Times and the Wall
Street Journal demonstrates that neither of these newspapers was completely free of Orientalism
when it comes to Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam between 1985 and 2016. While it is also
evident that there were a couple of articles published by the New York Times and the Wall Street
Journal that were nuanced and did not employ Orientalism, the majority of the articles still fit the
definition of Orientalism and/or neo-Orientalism. Since this section demonstrated the journalists’
approach to Islam and Muslims in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal, the next
section will examine the portrayal of the Gulen movement to demonstrate that the movement had
been positively portrayed by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. The following
chapter will examine and demonstrate why this portrayal is problematic.

http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398911896?accountid=28267
290
Ibid.
291
Summer Said and Ellen Knickmeyer, “World News: Reformist Cleric Named To Enforce Saudi Morals,” Wall
Street Journal, January 14, 2012, accessed September 2, 2018,
http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/916138267?accountid=28267.

66

THE POSITIVE PORTRAYAL OF FETHULLAH GULEN AND THE GULEN
MOVEMENT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
For this section, I examined Fethullah Gulen and his movement’s portrayal between the
years 1998 and 2016 in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal. Before 1998, there
were not any accounts either on Gulen or on the movement. The articles on the Gulen movement
were only critical or investigative of Gulen and his movement when the reported issue was about
Gulen affiliated charter schools. Almost none of the articles were critical or even investigative of
Gulen’s ideology. The articles that dealt with the rivalry between the once prime minister, and the
current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen
movement also failed to examine or accurately represent the ideology of the Gulen movement.
And finally, articles that directly focused on the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen, in
addition to lacking criticism and proper investigation of Gulen and the movement, usually
referred to the people who opposed Gulen as radical seculars. I identified five articles that
pointed out the questionable nature of the movement and Fethullah Gulen but the majority of the
articles that dealt directly with Gulen falsely portrayed the movement as a moderate religious
movement. The following section will thematically examine the articles, starting with the charter
schools issue, I will then examine Gulen’s portrayal in articles that focused on the feud between
Erdogan and Gulen, and finally, the last part will demonstrate the articles that focused solely on
Gulen that misrepresented and falsely portrayed the movement as moderate without mentioning
the alarming characteristics of the movement and Gulen’s ideology. It is also worth noting that
there is no exact definition of “moderate Muslim” and the meaning has been debated.292 A
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scholar from the University of Leiden, Alex P. Schmidt, used Julia Tallmeister’s definition of
moderation in his article “Moderate Muslims and Islamist Terrorism: Between Denial and
Resistance:”293
Islamist movements that attempt to achieve their goals through bottom-up, non-violent
methods, and are able to both accept democratic values and tolerate perspectives other
than their own. In the same sense, ideological moderation is defined as the gradual
transformation of a movement’s core values and beliefs from rigid and fixed, to flexible
and tolerant.
Zeyno Baran’s definition also stressed toleration as one of the main characteristics of moderation:
“Moderate and secular Muslims, who embrace the compatibility of Islam and democracy and the
individual freedoms we all cherish in the West […]”294 Based on these two definitions of
moderate Muslim, it would be safe to say that the definition would include internalized tolerance,
flexibility, and the non-violent outlook. Based on this definition, classifying Gulen and the Gulen
movement as “moderate” is not accurate. While Gulen and the Gulen movement vehemently
support non-violence to non-Muslims and male Muslims, they cannot be considered tolerant,
since some of Gulen’s writings were essentially homophobic, or cannot be considered completely
non-violent since Gulen supports violence against women. An examination of the problematic
elements of Gulen and the movement’s ideology will be discussed in detail in the following
chapter. At the end of this section, I will briefly examine the more neutral and critical articles and
explain why they could be considered critical.
Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement started to appear in the New York Times
during the 2000s. Gulen’s name first mentioned by the New York Times in “World Briefing”
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section in 1999, where Gulen was referred as a “leader of a secretive sect.” Before the rivalry
between Gulen and Erdogan, Gulen mostly garnered the attention of the New York Times for the
movement affiliated schools and the controversies surrounding them. In 2006, Samantha M.
Shapiro stated that Gulen was a “part of a new trend of religious leaders who want a conservative
religion that can function in harmony with a globalized world” in the New York Times Magazine
where she referred to Gulen as “Sufi master.295 Sabrina Tavernise’s article, contributed by
Sebnem Arsu, was published in March 2008 described Fethullah Gulen as someone who
“combines Sufi religious philosophy with modern science, offering a blend of Islamic tradition
and secular modernism in hundreds of schools that his followers have built.”296 The emphasis on
alleged secularism of Gulen schools persisted throughout the years. In May 2008, Tavernise
described the Gulen movement and affiliated schools as a moderate alternative to radical Islam
that was becoming prominent in Pakistan. Tavernise stated that Gulen movement’s view of Islam
was “moderate and flexible, comfortably coexisting with the West while remaining distinct from
it,” and that the movement was “like Muslim Peace Corps volunteers, they promote this approach
in schools, which are now established in more than 80 countries, Muslim and Christian.”297
Gulen’s ideology claimed to be STEM friendly by Tavernise, Gulen’s approach to science and
religion was explained as "without science, religion turns to radicalism, and without religion,
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science is blind and brings the world to danger" by one of Gulen’s followers.298 The article
argued that Said Nursi’s followers, the theologian whom Gulen was influenced of, “were seeking
ways to coexist with [science].”299 While the next chapter discusses these claims in detail, it is
worth noting that Gulen is a creationist and frequently denied the scientific consensus. Adama
Diop, a scholar from the Dakar University in Senegal, wrote on Gulen’s approach to science and
evolution in an article that can still be found on Fethullah Gulen’s official website.300 Diop said
that “F. Gulen was aiming to change society through Education. The system he advocates gives
priority to the teaching of SCIENCES, Science being considered as a tool for understanding the
miracles of the Quran,” when he was explaining how Gulen affiliated schools helped to change
the education system in Sub-Saharan Africa.301 Another evidence of Gulen’s anti-evolution
stance could be also found on his official website. Taken from one of his books, Questions and
Answers About Islam Vol. I, Gulen argued that the theory of evolution was not factual.302
Stephanie Saul’s article, published in 2011, examined the controversy surrounding the charter
schools in Texas, allegedly owned by the Gulen movement.303 Saul stated that Gulen “Preaches
the need to embrace modernity in a peace-loving, ecumenical version of Islam. At the center of
his philosophy is the concept of “hizmet” — public service.”304 While Saul pointed out the
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controversy regarding the charter schools and dealt extensively with the allegedly corrupt visa
practices and corruption in awarding contracts, she did not criticize or point out the problematic
aspects of the movement itself.305 David Lepeska’s article that dealt with a Gulen affiliated
Islamic college in Chicago, the American Islamic College, referred to the Gulen movement as a
“secretive movement.”306 The article reported that the Gulen (Hizmet) movement promoted
“public service and education and oversees research institutes, universities, media outlets and one
of Turkey's largest banks.”307 According to Lepeska, the school officials argued that the school
aligned with Gulen’s religious ideology, which claimed to be “a more moderate form of
Islam.”308 While Lepeska emphasized the allegedly corrupt visa practices employed by Gulen
affiliated schools, he did not mention any of the ideological allegations against Gulen and the
Gulen movement.309 Stephanie Saul’s article “Audits for 3 Georgia Schools Tied to Turkish
Movement” is another example of the lack of criticism of Gulen’s ideology.310 The article pointed
out the dubious visa practices of the Gulen schools in the U.S. but also emphasized that while the
schools were “inspired by Mr. Gulen and teach Turkish language and culture,” stated Saul, “they
did not teach religion.”311 Tim Arango’s article of Gulen “Raids and Graft Inquiry in Turkey Are
Seen by Some as Muslim Cleric's Plot” referred to him as a “Charismatic preacher who leads one
of the most influential Islamic movements in the world and commands an empire of secular
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schools […]”312 It is evident that the New York Times journalists were emphasizing the secular
nature of these schools while also pointing out the bureaucratic controversy surrounding them.
Aside from news regarding the Gulen-affiliated charter schools, Gulen was featured in
the New York Times for the polarizing rivalry between Erdogan and his movement. The
commonality shared by these articles is that they referred to Gulen as a “preacher,” or a “leader,”
but failed to explain the movement’s ideology other than a couple of generic sentences that stated
Gulen owned a media empire and had been living in the U.S. on a self-exile since 1999. Tim
Arango and Sebnem Arsu wrote “Growing Corruption Inquiry Hits Close to Turkish Leader” in
2013, where they argued that Fethullah Gulen and Erdogan “combined forces in a battle with the
country's secular military elite, sending them back to the barracks in recent years and establishing
Turkey as a successful example of a moderate, democratic Islamic government.”313 Fethullah
Gulen was portrayed as pro-Israel and the article indicated that the power struggle between
Erdogan and Gulen was due to their disagreements on Turkish foreign policy.314 A Gulen
affiliate, Huseyin Gulerce, explained that the followers of the Gulen movement were complaining
about the growingly authoritarian Erdogan regime and the abandonment of the “pursuit of
membership in the European Union.”315 Another article by Arango and Arsu claimed that the
Erdogan-Gulen collaboration “aimed to rid Turkish politics of the influence of the military,
which carried out three coups in the 20th century and protected the secular elite while oppressing
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the pious classes.”316 The article barely mentioned why Gulen had to leave Turkey in 1999 by
stating that “[Gulen left Turkey] for exile in America after he was accused of trying to establish
an Islamic state.”317 The authors avoided mentioning why the accusations were made in the first
place –as a result of a leaked footage where Gulen was instructing his followers to infiltrate the
state institutions.318 In contrast, an article written by Dan Bilefsky and Sebnem Arsu, in 2012,
reported the so-called politically motivated charges against journalists under the name of
“Sledgehammer” by the Turkish government. This article briefly touched upon the alleged role of
the Gulen movement in the alleged “political purge” by stating that according to analysts the
Gulen movement’s members “have infiltrated the highest levels of the country’s police and
judiciary.”319 While an article written by Ceylan Yeginsu only two years later, in 2014, pointed
out Gulen’s affiliation with the Sledgehammer case and the extensive use of dubious evidence,
Bilefsky and Arsu’s article mainly dealt with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s growingly oppressive
government.320 Two other articles written by Ceylan Yeginsu, one in 2014, the other in 2015,
referred to Gulen as an “influential Muslim cleric” and solely dealt with mutual allegations
between Erdogan and Gulen’s followers without providing any information regarding Gulen’s
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ideology.321 In Tim Arango’s account, Gulen was portrayed as the owner of an empire of secular
schools.322 The article quoted Jenny White, a scholar at the Stockholm University Institute for
Turkish Studies. “The goal,” White said, “is to create a "golden generation of young people who
are educated in science, but have Muslim ethics.”323 Another expert who was quoted in the article
was James F. Jeffrey, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, claimed that the Gulen movement was
a “cultlike” movement while arguing that it would have been near impossible for Gulenists to
infiltrate the armed forces.324 The article did not feature any Turkish scholars’ opinion. Sebnem
Arsu and Brian Knowlton wrote in their 2014 article that Gulen “Promotes a moderate, proWestern brand of Sunni Islam that appeals to many well-educated and professional Turks, once
made common cause against the country's staunchly secular military and political leadership.”325
Arsu and Knowlton did not explain why they preferred to refer Gulen’s ideology as “moderate”
and “pro-Western.” An editorial from 2014 also referred to Gulen as a promoter of “a moderate,
pro-Western brand of Sunni Islam that appeals to many well-educated and professional Turks.”326
In 2015, Katie Rogers referred to Gulen as a critic of Erdogan in her article “Turkey Frees Two
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Journalists, but a Colleague Is Still Held.”327 Stephanie Saul’s article regarding the attempted
coup accusations targeting Gulen, from 2016, mainly focused on the Gulen’s accusations of
Erdogan and comparing the current Turkish government to Nazi Germany.328 Saul’s account
lacked any sort of criticism of the Gulen movement and she defined the movement as:
At the core of his movement, promoted as a peace-loving form of Islam, is the concept of
Hizmet, which his followers describe as a type of public service.329
Some other articles that dealt with the power struggle between Erdogan and Gulen that
did not include any examination of Gulen’s ideology and simply refer to him as a “spiritual
leader,” “cleric,” “imam,” or a “preacher” are the following: “Purge of Police Said to Be Move
by Turkey to Disrupt Graft Inquiry;” “In Push Against Muslim Cleric, Turkey Detains Police
Officers and Journalists;” “Turks Are Glued to a Sensational Drama, This One Political;”
“Turkish Officers Convicted in 2012 Coup Case Are Released; In Scandal,” “Turkey's Leaders
May Be Losing Their Tight Grip on The news media;” “Not on Ballot, Turkey's Premier Still
Gets Push From Party in Local Elections;” “A Debate Becomes a Brawl as Turkey's Parliament
Votes to Rein In Courts;” “Turkey: Cleric's Passport Is Revoked; In Blow to Turkish President;”
“Court Halts Closing of Schools;” “Turkey's Wrong Turn; “Sharp Denials After Arrest of
Journalists in Turkey;” “Prosecutor Overseeing Turkish Graft Inquiry Is Removed From Case;”
“Premier Tries to Keep Power, as President;” “Obama Meets Erdogan in an Effort to Patch Up
Differences With Turkey;” “Number of Imprisoned Journalists Hits Record, Advocacy Group
Says;” “A Complicated Alliance With Turkey;” “Turkey Purges Thousands and Blocks
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Wikipedia;” “Angela Merkel, Meeting With Erdogan in Turkey, Emphasizes Free Speech;” “40
Sentenced to Life for Plot to Assassinate Turkey's President.”330
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The articles that focused solely on Gulen or the Gulen movement were a rarity in the
New York Times in comparison to charter schools and the rivalry between Gulen and Erdogan.
However, the earliest article on Gulen, published in 2000, “Turkish Court Voids Warrant for
Islamic Leader” referred to Gulen as a “prominent Islamic leader” and pointed out his
connections with “senior politicians and religious leaders” was an article solely on Gulen and his
movement.331 The article also stated how Gulen explained his motives, “[He] only wanted Turkey
to be more tolerant of ethnic and religious diversity.”332 “Turkey Assails a Revered Islamic
Moderate” written in 2000 by Douglas Frantz referred to the Gulen movement as a “prospering
Islamic community,” stated that Gulen “promoted a moderate brand of Islam.” 333 This article
also argued that a possibility of an extradition request for Gulen from the Turkish authorities
unsettled the liberals who were not associated with the Gulen movement; an argument that
indicated the liberal nature of the movement. Frantz also reported that Gulen argued that he was
seeking a more tolerant government which “treated ethnic and ideological differences as a
cultural mosaic, not a reason for discrimination.”334 Frantz also praised Gulen’s schools by
stating that they were expensive private schools with religious curriculum approved by the
state.335 Neither of these articles did provide the points of views of the people who were critical
of the movement and only mentioned them as “the secular hard-liners” or the “secular elite.” By
ignoring the diversity among the critics of Gulen the authors overgeneralized his critics labeling
them as “extreme seculars.” In 2009, the New York Times referred to Taraf, a pro-Gulenist

331

“Turkish Court Voids Warrant for Islamic Leader,” New York Times, August 29, 2000, accessed September 6,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/29/world/turkish-court-voids-warrant-for-islamic-leader.html.
332
Ibid.
333
Douglas Frantz, “Turkey Assails a Revered Islamic Moderate,” New York Times, August 25, 2018, accessed
September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/25/world/turkey-assails-a-revered-islamic-moderate.html.
334
Ibid.
335
Ibid.

77

newspaper that was often criticized for its fabrication of evidence during the Sledgehammer case
that resulted in a purge of the seculars in the Turkish Armed Forces, as a “liberal newspaper.”336
Tavernise’s 2010 article “Army Ebbs, And Power Realigns In Turkey,” mentioned the possibility
of Gulen’s involvement in the alleged effort of the government’s campaign to silence the
opposition. Tavernise referred to Gulen as a “preacher” and the Gulen movement as an “Islamic
network.” Tavernise did not point out the questionable evidence provided by Taraf and the antisecularism allegations about Gulen and the Gulen movement. Rock Gladstone’s account on
Gulen from 2016 stated that Gulen “is the overseer of a religious movement that runs schools,
charities and other enterprises in a number of countries, but that the Turkish government
considers a terrorist organization.”337 In 2016, Fethullah Gulen himself referred to his movement
as moderate in an article he authored in the New York Times.338
At a time when Western democracies are searching for moderate Muslim voices, I and my
friends in the Hizmet movement have taken a clear stance against extremist violence,
from the Sept. 11 attacks by Al Qaeda to brutal executions by the Islamic State to the
kidnappings by Boko Haram.339
In 2016, an article written by Tim Arango, Ceylan Yeginsu, and Safak Timur explained
that “[Gulen] has been embraced in the past by the West for espousing a vision of moderate Islam
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and interfaith dialogue.”340 Again in 2016, the New York Times claimed that Gulen “Has
promoted a more liberal stream of Islam […]”341
While the vast majority of the articles published in the New York Times did not properly
and factually portray Gulen and the Gulen movement there were a couple of articles that stood
apart from the majority. An article written by Dan Bilefsky and Sebnem Arsu explained the
controversies surrounding the movement in 2012.342 Mustafa Akyol’s account from 2016 pointed
out the hierarchical structure of the movement and the cultish characteristics.343
Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement mostly garnered the attention of the Wall Street
Journal because of the rivalry between Gulen and Erdogan. The charter school issue was
virtually uncovered by the Wall Street Journal which was one of the most covered topics
regarding the Gulen movement in the New York Times. The number of articles written on Gulen
and the movement before the Gulen vs. Erdogan rivalry was also limited. Regardless of the topics
and the quantity of the articles, the evidence demonstrates the positive portrayal of Gulen and the
Gulen movement in the Wall Street Journal. Based on the evidence, it would be fair to argue that
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal employed a similarly positive outlook to Gulen
and the Gulen movement.
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The first report that focused solely on Fethullah Gulen in the Wall Street Journal dates
back to 1998. Hugh Pope’s portrayal of Gulen pointed out that even though the Turkish
government was worried about Gulen infiltrating the state he was accepted by the Pope Jean Paul
II, which was “A rare honor for a Turkish Muslim.”344 Pope also stated that Gulen was one of
Turkey’s most respected Muslim leaders.345 Pope’s article implied that Gulen was legitimized
since he was accepted by a Christian religious leader.346 Claire Berlinski stated in 2010 that there
were conspiracy theories against the Gulen movement while pointing out the Gulenists’ theories
were also impossible to prove.347 Berlinski did not provide any evidence for the fears surrounding
the Gulen movement, even though what the Gulen movement openly advocating was against
many Turkish laws, such as encouraging violence against women.348 In 2010, Joe Lauria also
praised Gulen:
Mr. Gulen preaches nonviolence, dialogue between Western and Muslim worlds, and an
educational tradition that combines study of science and Islam. His newspaper columns,
weekly Internet sermons and other messages have been collected into more than 60
books.349
Lauria’s article did not provide the names of the books, nor it mentioned any of Gulen’s writings
that cannot be considered “moderate.” The same year Andrew Mango described Fethullah Gulen
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as a preacher who wanted to “engage with the modern world.”350 Asli Aydintasbas stated that
Nedim Sener, a journalist, got arrested recently because he “Exposed the influence of Fethullah
Gulen -- an Islamic preacher living in the United States -- on Turkish security forces.”351 While
Aydintasbas’ article focused on the allegedly politically motivated arrests of journalists, it did not
mention Gulen for the second time in this article.
The power struggle between Erdogan and Gulen attracted some serious interest from the
Wall Street Journal. Emre Peker, in his 2013 article, referred to Gulen as “a reclusive, influential
Muslim cleric,” and explained the movement as “the moderate Islamic movement is estimated to
have at least a million followers including AKP lawmakers, prosecutors and police in Turkey.”352
Another article by Peker, published a couple of days after the previous article, stated that
“[Erdogan’s] supporters seem to have fallen out with a faction loyal to a former ally, Fethullah
Gulen, whose millions of followers helped elect Mr. Erdogan three times.”353 A few more articles
written around this time by Peker credited Gulen for Erdogan’s success and referred to Gulen as
“Erdogan’s rival” but did not examine the nature of the movement.354 Soner Cagaptay stated that
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the Gulen movement promoted “conservative yet relatively modern” message in 2013 in an
article he co-wrote with Jim Jeffrey.355 In 2014, Joe Parkinson and Ayla Albayrak portrayed
Gulen as a charismatic cleric who “preaches a message of tolerance to his millions of followers
from his self-imposed exile.”356 Parkinson and Albayrak also argued that Gulen “gained a broad
following for his moderate sermons in the 1960s and '70s.”357 Parkinson and Albayrak ignored
the fact that Gulen was tried for his remarks during sermons and his sermons were not considered
moderate by the secular Turkish law.358 Another Parkinson article referred to Gulen simply as a
“Turkish imam,” along with Emre Peker’s more recent article co-authored with Ayla Albayrak
from 2014, where Gulen was referred as a “U.S.-based cleric,” did not mention any of the
controversies surrounding the movement or Gulen.359 Some other articles where the authors
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referred to Gulen as “cleric,” “imam,” “preacher,” or simply as “former ally of Erdogan” and did
not examine the nature of the movement and Gulen’s ideology are the following: “Struggle in
Turkey Tarnishes Lender,” “Soccer Club Chief Sees Plot Behind His Conviction,” “World News:
Turf Fight Escalates Amid Turkish Cases,” “World News: Social-Network Sites Under Fire in
Turkey,” “World News: Turkish Court Tries Alleged Coup Plotters --- Move Against President's
Opponents Puts Dozens of Soccer Fans on Trial,” “World News: Turkish Scandal Ripples in
U.S.,” “Net Loss: Turkey Builds New Model For Web Censorship,” “Global Finance: Turkey
Takes Over Bank, As Political Fight Heats Up,” “World News: Turkish Court Acquits Officers in
Coup Plot --- Reversal of convictions seen to help president's effort to fix damaged ties with
armed forces,” “World News: Government Seizes Bank Caught Up In Politics,” “World News:
Two TV Stations Seized in Istanbul,” “A Christian Pastor in Turkey's Prisons,” “World News:
Turkey Sentences Officers for Coup,” “World News: U.N. Orders Turkey To Release Judge,”
“World News: NBA Star Dodges a Turkish Crackdown --- 'It's Crazy,' Thunder's Kanter says of
effort to round up foes of President Erdogan,” and “Erdogan's American Enemies List” where the
author Sohrab Ahmari pointed out that Bernard Lewis was accurately predicted the future of
Turkey as a country that accepted a “Some form of Islamist rule.”360
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The Wall Street Journal also provided a medium for Gulen to publish his own article in
2015. “Muslims Must Combat the Extremist Cancer” written by Gulen, was published on
September 4th, right before the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, argued that every Muslim should
promote human rights:
[…] Muslims must publicly promote human rights -- dignity, life and liberty. These are
the most basic of Islamic values and no individual, nor any political or religious leader,
has the authority to snatch them away. Living the essence of our faith means respecting
diversity -- cultural, social, religious and political. God identifies learning from one
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another as the primary goal of diversity (Quran 49:13). Respecting each human being as a
creation of God (17:70) is respecting God.361
Gulen argued that Muslim societies must provide modern education to their members and that
was what the “Hizmet” movement had been doing with more than a thousand schools around the
world. He also emphasized the importance of women’s equality in society and pointed out that
Muhammad’s wife Aisha was a well-educated teacher and a community leader.362 Regardless of
what Gulen argued on the pages of the Wall Street Journal, the evidence demonstrates that this
was a false self-representation. The next chapter will examine and demonstrate why Gulen’s
claims regarding human rights, respecting diversity, and respecting every human along with
women’s equality and modern education would be discredited by his own writings.
The rivalry between Erdogan and Gulen got escalated after the failed coup attempt in
2016 where Erdogan blamed Gulen for masterminding the coup. The charter school controversy
regarding the movement also garnered interest from the Wall Street Journal for the first time in
2016. While the earliest article published in 2014 which recognized Gulen’s ties with the U.S.
charter schools, it was not until 2016 the controversies were recognized.363 Dan Frosch’s article,
“U.S. News: Turkey Ties Dissident to U.S. Schools,” was the first article in the Wall Street
Journal that pointed out the Gulen movement owned charter schools and focused on the
complaint filed by the lawyers of the Turkish government against the schools. This article
reported the claims of the Turkish government rather than examining the actual controversies
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surrounding the schools like the New York Times.364 Beckie Strum’s article was also similar to
Frosch’s article and only dealt with the allegations of the Turkish government.365 Douglas Belkin
and Tawnell D. Hobbs’ article “World News: Texas Probes Gulen Tie to Schools” also only
reported the allegations of the Turkish government.366 Saeed Shah explained the Gulen
movement’s schools in Pakistan by stating that “Its 26 fee-based schools educate some 10,000
children and have a reputation for quality education and moderate religious views.”367 In August
2016, Barrett Devlin and Adam Entous became the first Wall Street Journal authors who pointed
out the “Long-running Federal Bureau of Investigation probe into whether financial crimes were
committed at U.S. schools linked to Mr. Gulen.”368 Thomas Grove argued that Gulen’s ideology
aligned with moderate Islam in 2016 by stating that “[Gulen] started a series of schools aimed at
giving poorer Turkish students a quality education at an affordable price, albeit laden with his
version of moderate Islam.”369 Douglas Belkin, Jeanne Ianthe Dugan, and Beckie Strum
portrayed Gulen as a moderate in their 2016 article. “Mr. Gulen, who preaches a moderate brand
of Islam,” claimed the authors “is known for his powerful sermons on peace, tolerance and
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harmony, spread via books and video.”370 Another article by the same authors, also published in
2016, explained Gulen’s success by stating that “Mr. Gulen rose to prominence in Turkey in the
1980s with his moderate Islamic teachings combining religion, democracy and science.”371 The
same year, Margaret Cooker referred to Gulen as a “moderate religious leader” in her article
“World News: Turkey Premier Urges U.S. Help.”372
Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal only published a handful of
articles that could be considered critical of Fethullah Gulen or the Gulen movement until 2016.
For example, a Turkish scholar, Soner Cagaptay’s article in 2010 entitled “Turkey’s Republic of
Fear” referred to the Gulen movement as “ultra-conservative Fethullah Gulen Movement.”373 Jay
Solomon also approached the movement with some suspicion in his 2016 article where he stated
that “Mr. Gulen, in the past, hasn't made secret his hope that his supporters, who promote Turkish
nationalism and Islamic values, would gradually dominate the ranks of the country's
bureaucracy.”374
The articles above demonstrate the positive portrayal of the Gulen movement and
Fethullah Gulen by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. While the New York Times
was outspoken about the alleged corruption in Gulen affiliated schools, the Wall Street Journal
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chose to mostly ignore to report on the charter schools issue. The articles that did not criticize
Gulen or the Gulen movement referred to Gulen mostly as an “imam,” “preacher,” or a “cleric,”
without pointing out the controversies surround Gulen and his movement in their home country.
These articles also dismissed the Turkish concerns as if they were coming from some radical
faction and referred to the critics of Gulen as “seculars,” “secular hard-liners,” or indicated their
support of military while pointing out the military enacted coups in order to protect the secular
identity of the country. The handful of critical articles also did not point out the problems with
Gulen’s ideology, never pointed out his support of violence against women, his hostility towards
the LGBTQ+ communities, his disregard of modern science, and his lack of tolerance towards
atheists. The reluctance of journalists to point out these characteristics of Gulen’s ideology could
be explained by many reasons but I argue that there are two main reasons behind this falseportrayal: 1) the absolute favoritism of Gulen and the Gulen movement by the American
academia and 2) the still persistent Orientalism in the New York Times and in the Wall Street
Journal. Since Orientalism sees the Orient as hesitant to change, monolithic, and perceives it and
its peoples as backward and uncivilized, arguing for Gulen and the Gulen movement’s
progressiveness indicate the overgeneralized backwardness of the Muslims in the Western eyes.
When extremely conservative schools of Islam, such as Wahhabism, considered the ideology of
Gulen can be easily seen as moderate or even progressive. After all, Gulen advocates a relative
betterment of women’s status and absolute lack of violence to non-Muslims.375 In Wahhabism,
on the other hand, the use of violence for jihad is sometimes justified and the exclusion of
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women from social and economic activity is widespread.376 When compared to Wahhabism, the
Gulen movement is progressive and moderate, however, arguing that the Gulen movement is
progressive and moderate without comparing it to a stricter ideology reveals the assumption of
monolithic Islam. Modern Turkey, founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, allowed women
to go to schools along with male pupils in 1924, banned polygyny and allowed divorce for
women with the new Turkish Civil Law in 1926. Finally, in 1934 the Turkish women gained full
suffrage.377 The first modern Turkish constitution from 1924 stated that every Turk was equal in
front of the law and stated that it was mandatory for both genders to have the primary
education.378 The new constitution of 1961 expanded the equality claim and stated that every
citizen of Turkey was equal in front of the law regardless of their race, gender, and religion.379
The same constitution also declared women and children as the ones to be protected by the
state.380 In 1998, domestic violence was officially outlawed by the Turkish state.381 In short, it is
evident that while Gulen’s ideology could be considered moderate for another Muslim majority
country, it cannot be considered moderate or progressive in the case of Turkey, Gulen’s home
country. Since Gulen advocated domestic violence and violence against women, it would be fair
to say that his teachings are regressive for the Muslim majority Republic of Turkey. Therefore, I
argue that portraying Gulen as a moderate and progressive cleric and the Gulen movement as a
moderate and progressive movement are Orientalist because it clearly indicates the monolithic
376
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perception of Islam, overgeneralizing of Muslims into a single stereotype where women are
disfranchised and often victimized by patriarchy, and also the perception of Muslim’s reluctance
to change since many Muslims and Muslim societies have already progressed beyond Gulen’s
ideology. The next chapter will explain the American academia’s approach and portrayal of
Gulen and the Gulen movement and demonstrate why both the New York Times and the Wall
Street Journal journalists were wrong to portray Gulen and the Gulen movement as moderate and
progressive along with American academics.
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CHAPTER II: MISREPRESENTATION OF FETHULLAH GULEN AND THE GULEN
MOVEMENT BY THE ACADEMIA
This chapter negates the US scholars’ and journalists’ portrayal of Fethullah Gulen and
the Gulen movement and argues that the Gulen movement is essentially highly political, where
Gulen ties religion to national identity and civilization, aims to impose a sexist ideology that
conforms traditional gender roles and imprisons women to domestic sphere in addition to
imposing outdated and factually wrong scientific knowledge to the public to further strengthen
the religious identity. Gulen’s objective was defined as Turkifying Islam, and Islamizing the
Turkish national identity; re-establishing the Ottoman idea of linking religion and state together
where the rulers follow Islamic rules in their private lives to strengthen the state and protect the
society.382
The Gulen movement has attracted almost only positive reactions both by the news
media and by American academics. Neither Fethullah Gulen, the Gulen movement, or a person
who identifies as a Gulenist were criticized for supporting actions or ideas that directly contradict
the clauses of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Except for Soner Cagaptay’s article
that was published in the New York Times in 2010, neither the New York Times or the Wall Street
Journal mentioned Gulen’s ideology that would inevitably cause human rights abuses in the
countries or societies where it is employed. The most obvious reason behind this lack of criticism
is the academics’ absolute favoritism of the Gulen movement even though there is contradictory
evidence, easily available, to debunk their arguments. Journalists, who often consult academics’
ideas to comprehend foreign entities, such as the Gulen movement, end up being reluctant to
point out or be completely unaware of the problems associated with these entities. A journalist
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would be completely comfortable calling Gulen “a moderate cleric” or portray him as someone
who supports gender equality because, except for few exceptions, that was exactly what the
academic works were saying about Gulen. Journalists’ hesitancy to challenge the established
academic consensus is understandable since journalists do not always possess the same
comprehension of the field or the region as the expert academics.
Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement portrayed themselves as religious in private
life but a politically secular movement that can exist within the democratic and secular state of
Turkey. Their portrayal included being an apolitical entity that promotes gender equality, modern
scientific knowledge that can co-exist with Islam, and inter-religious dialogue. Their approach to
women’s rights, emphasis on modern education, where they teach Islam and science are
supplementary to each other, and their work towards interreligious dialogue and promotion of
toleration attracted much attention in the Western academic world.
One of the earliest scholarly works regarding the Gulen movement was a series of
works published under the name Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement in
2003, edited by Hakan M. Yavuz, a political scientist at the University of Utah, and John L.
Esposito. Yavuz is a prominent scholar, who produced a considerable amount of work on the
movement, recently started to criticize the movement and its political and anti-secular nature
according to his interview with the daily newspaper Hurriyet.383 In Turkish Islam and the Secular
State: The Gulen Movement secularism in Turkey was defined as “an intellectual and political
project in Turkey has a long history of differentiating marginalizing and excluding large sectors
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of Turkish society.”384 The authors accused the Young Turks and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk for
depending on science and technology for economic development and trying to shape the society
based on positivist philosophy.385 The book consisted of twelve works that dealt directly with
Gulen and his ideology and the overall theme was the progressive nature of the movement.
Despite the contradictory evidence given by authors regarding gender inequality and political
nature of the movement Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement portrayed the
Gulen movement as a reformed future for Islam.
The perception of the Gulen movement mostly positive in the US –aside from the
alleged corrupt visa practices– despite some critical views of the movement in Turkey and around
Europe. Martin Riexinger, from the Aarhus University in Denmark, criticized the movement for
replacing the Kemalist “suppression” of the religious life in modern Turkey with American
fundamentalism.386 The director of the Turkish Media Project at the Middle East Media
Research Institute, Rachel Sharon-Krespin, was highly critical of the movement’s self-portrayal
as a progressive and apolitical movement and pointed out the political objectives employed by
the Gulen movement.387 Sharon-Krespin stated that “It appears Gulen is not fighting for more
individual freedoms but to free Islam from the confines of the mosque and the private domain of
individuals and to bring it to the public arena, to govern every aspect of life in the country.”388
Criticism originated in Turkey targeted the movement’s claimed that the movement did not
support gender equality and women’s rights.389
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Wilson Center scholar Bulent Aras praised the Movement’s approach to women’s rights
and gender equality. Aras classified Gulen’s views of women as progressive because Gulen’s
arguments decreased the importance of the veil.390 According to Gulen women can hold high
positions when they work outside of their homes and no one should be judged based on how they
dressed.391 Dr. Sophia Pandya, who holds a Ph.D. in Religious Studies, recognized that the
movement's events in the U.S. becoming less gender segregated and that there was some
progression; male followers who live in the U.S. became more accustomed to the American
culture and as a result, started to help their wives at home.392 Pandya stated that accusing the
movement of patriarchy would eliminate the role taken by women in the movement.393
Bernadette Andrea was another scholar who praised Fethullah Gulen’s views of women and
stated that he was a “champion of women’s rights.”394 Aras, Pandya, and Andrea all seem to
agree that Gulen was a feminist based on his argument of the non-essential nature of the
veil/headscarf and his views on working women, who, according to Gulen, can hold high
positions.
Hakan M. Yavuz also agreed that Fethullah Gulen himself was progressive regarding
gender roles and women’s rights, based on his views on the veil and working women, but his
views were facing resistance within the movement since the members held more conservative
views.395 Mark Webb agreed with Yavuz regarding the resistance and argued that even though
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Gulen never voiced any opinions for gender segregation, the Gulen schools segregate students
and teachers [both Muslim and non-Muslim] based on gender.396 Maria Curtis attributed this
“slow progression” towards gender equality to the fact that many Gulenists came from traditional
Turkish families.397
Fethullah Gulen and the Movement’s views on LGBTQ+ rights had not attracted much
attention by the scholars, mainly due to the fact that neither Gulen nor the movement had been
outspoken about this issue. However, Webb stated that it was impossible for a committed
member to be openly gay, and claimed that the lack of voiced opinion by Gulen on the LGBTQ+
rights was a vulnerability for the movement.398 While most of the movement’s supporters in the
West were theologically and socially liberal, Turkish Gulenists tended to be conservatives. He
argued that this rift along with women’s rights issues may hurt the interreligious dialogue the
movement was trying to achieve.399
The Gulen movement had also been praised by scholars for promoting Turkish language
and culture, promoting a message of peace and tolerance, and providing teachers who were
positive role models to pupils while offering high-quality STEM-oriented education. Fuller
explained the movement’s emphasis on peace and tolerance with their rationalism: “[The Gulen
movement] is rationalist in its views and places great emphasis on tolerance toward all other
religious (and even non-religious) views within a pluralist society that express the multi-faceted
panoply of God’s creation.”400
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Elisabeth Ozdalga stated that Gulen schools did not teach Islam but “They introduce
ethics through the exemplary conduct of their teachers.” According to Ozdalga, helping students
to “internalize qualities of self-discipline, self-sacrifice, and tolerance” are among the duties of
the teachers.401 Hakan M. Yavuz investigated Gulen’s use of educational networks to spread
Islamic values. He stated that Gulen “Schools seek to consolidate conservative Islamic and
Turkish values.” The footnote explained this sentence further, “Women can be either teachers or
secretaries in these schools, and there are no women teachers in boys’ schools. Moreover,
students are taught to respect authority.”402 Yavuz stated that the movement emphasizes the idea
that modern science was compatible with Islam and that being a good citizen is related to being
pious.403
Graham E. Fuller, who was a political analyst specializing in Islamic extremism who
served as the former chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the Central Intelligence
Agency, stated that the Gulen movement believed that science and Islam could co-exist, and that
modern education and knowledge serve “to reveal God's presence and grand purpose in the
universe the movement strives to create a higher level of moral consciousness in society thus
leading over time to more enlightened governance.”404 The Movement’s strong emphasis on
offering “good quality secular education” was explained by the movement’s perception of
education which was seen as a way to get closer to God, by Fuller.405 Unlike Yavuz, Fuller did
not recognize the issues with gender segregation in Gulen schools and considered them as secular
institutions. Fuller, similarly to Yavuz, portrayed the movement as an apolitical and progressive
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movement that emphasized education in his book The Future of Political Islam published in
2003.406 Fuller also mentioned the movement’s tolerant attitude toward other religions and to the
non-religious.407 Fuller’s view was also shared by Bulent Aras. Aras argued that the movement
was against Political Islam and had no political interests.408 Sociologist Helen Rose Fuchs
Ebaugh agreed with Fuller on the Gulen movement’s moderate nature and its dedication to
interfaith dialogue and educating the youth.409
The scholars explained the criticism of Gulen and the Movement in Turkey with the
authoritarian nature of the secular Turkish regime. In Turkish Islam and the Secular State the
authoritarian regime was criticized by Esposito: “[…] as the Mustafa Kemal saying went
‘Science is the truest guide in life.’ So, the Kemalist laicism is not about the separation of politics
and religion, but rather about restructuring society in accordance with positivist philosophy. In
practice, this restructuring means preventing religious influence in the spheres of education,
economics, family, dress code, and politics.”410
The perception of the movement as a progressive future for Islam was explained by
Bulent Aras in “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face:”
[Gulen] looks at the Islamic regulations bearing directly on government (such as taxation
and warfare) in light of contemporary realities. This leads him to the conclusion […] that
the democratic form of government is the best choice […] [Gulen says that] "no one can
suppress the progress of women through the clothes they have to wear." Furthermore, he
says, "women can become administrators," contradicting the views of most Islamic
intellectuals. Gulen emphasizes worldly education and favors integration with the modern
world. Gulen wishes to merge Islam into the international political system and the
economy; he supports Turkey's bid for membership to the European Union […].411
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As it could be understood from the quotation above, Gulen was praised for his non-extremist
interpretation (ijtihad) of Islam, where he offered relative freedom to women and a space for
functioning market economy along with a democratic state that aligned with Islamic ideals while
advocating for non-violence and tolerance.412 Gulen emphasized that religion was a matter of
private life and should not be politicized. Graham E. Fuller interpreted the progressiveness of the
movement as:
[The Gulen] movement […] dedicates the bulk of the movement’s energies to an
educational effort, including the founding of schools and study circles to propagate a
modernist approach to Islam based on broad moral teachings that are nearly universalist in
character. The focus on study reflects the movement’s belief that education and
knowledge in all fields, including science and technology, can never contradict religion
but only serve to reveal God’s presence and grand purpose in the universe. […]
[Gulenists] describe even the law of gravity, for example, as one of the elements of
Shari’a. […]The movement does not engage in political activity, has no party, and
believes that any legal government must be accorded respect.413
International Affairs and Islamic Studies scholar John L. Esposito is a known supporter of
the movement along with Fuller. John L. Esposito specifically stated that the Gulen movement
was a progressive movement.414 Esposito’s positive perception of the movement could be
explained by the relatively moderate nature of the ideology promoted by the Gulen movement.
Esposito stated that “Gulen emphasizes the centrality of freedom of thought and expression [and]
is open to other cultures.415 […] Gulen supports the full separation of religion and the state and
that he opposes religious parties.”416 Esposito also claimed that it was established that Gulen
affiliated schools and universities taught modern sciences along with “a reformist understanding
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of religion.”417 Esposito concluded his speech with a statement where he recognized Gulen as a
reformist.418
Hakan M. Yavuz, who held similar beliefs to Esposito about the movement, claimed that
the Turkish secularism should be considered top-down modernization project and explained the
bottom up-modernity as the following:
With those two different conceptions of modernity, you have also two different
conceptions of secularism in Turkey. One is the top-down modernization-project
conception of secularism: it is very much a laïcisme in the French sense. This approach
means that there is no room at all for religion in the public sphere, resulting in the
cleansing of religion from the public domain. Science becomes the guide, while religion
is something negative: something to get rid of. The second form of modernity – i.e.
bottom-up modernity – allows room for religion in the public sphere. Its conception of
secularism is in line with the Anglo-Saxon notion of this concept. Religion is seen as a
source of morality and ethics. It also does not see religion and politics as being
necessarily in conflict. However, it does not want religion to become a tool of politics,
because if something then goes wrong in politics, people will blame religion.419
Yavuz argued that Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement supported the latter, the bottom-up
modernity. Supporters of Gulen agreed that Gulen favored a form of Islam that could easily
function with a free market economy and a democratic state.
Academics in the U.S. portrayed the Gulen movement as an apolitical movement that was
secular in nature. Academics pointed out that Fethullah Gulen was a religious leader and the
movement was based on Islamic principles but they had no interest in influencing the political
sphere or reverse the secular achievements of the Turkish Republic. Their ideology allowed them
to co-exist with a secular government while staying away from politics. For instance, Graham E.
Fuller penned a recent article that was published in the Huffington Post after the latest coup-
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attempt in Turkey during the summer of 2016. Fuller explained the difference between Erdogan
and Gulen by emphasizing the apolitical nature of the movement.
But there are important differences between the two groups. Erdogan runs a political party
while Gulen operates a civil movement called Hizmet (“Service”). Erdogan comes out of
a more traditional Sunni Turkish Islamist movement; Gulen comes out of an apolitical,
more Sufi, mystical and social tradition. Gulen is interested in slow and deep social
change, including secular higher education; Erdogan as a party leader is first and foremost
interested in preserving his party’s power, operating in a populist manner, trying to raise
the general welfare.420
In 1999 Siyaset Meydani, a popular political talk show broadcasted a leaked
footage of Gulen speaking to his followers. In this footage, Gulen was seen as instructing how to
infiltrate the state institutions to his followers and emphasizing how important it was to comply
with the law and lay low until they infiltrated the law enforcement and the judicial system.
Gulen’s involvement in politics was not denied by many, Hakan M. Yavuz openly
mentioned his involvement with the new post-Coup Turkish identity known as the TurkishIslamic Synthesis that originated after the Coup of 1980. Yavuz stated that Gulen worked with
Turgut Ozal during this time.421 In Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:
The Gülen Movement, written in 2013, Yavuz aimed to demonstrate the statist nature of
the Gulen movement. Yavuz stated that the movement emphasized the modern science was
compatible with Islam and “That individuals must be pious in order to be good citizens.”422
There were, however, conflicted perceptions of Gulen’s political involvement. He had
been vocal about the much-debated presidential system. In 1997, Gulen stated that the
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groundwork should be laid out for the presidential system and that the people should be gradually
prepared for the system change.423 When questioned about Gulen’s involvement in politics,
Gulenists explained the situation by stating that it was Gulen’s natural right as a Turkish citizen
to voice his opinions on political matters. In addition to his natural right, his supporters added
that Gulen aimed to construct a common morality regarding public places as a modern religious
person.424
Gulen’s political objectives explained as the following in a pro-Gulen article,
“[Gulen] hopes to reestablish the link between religion and state that existed in the Ottoman era,
thereby reversing one of the most clear-cut features of the state established by Atatürk.”425 Fuller
also explained the controversy surrounding the movement in Turkey with Kemalist paranoia:
While such a movement should be viewed as an ideal model of modern
Islam, enlightened Muslim thinking, and a non-confrontational approach to politics and
the state, it is in fact the source of much controversy inside the Kemalist state that fear its
long range potential to bring back Islam into the hearts of Turkish citizenry in ways that
might affect the state-controlled secularism of the state.426
In Kucuk Dunyam, a book published in 1995 that essentially was a long interview with
Gulen conducted by one of his followers, Gulen recounted events that indicated his politically
active stance. “Hizmet (Gulen movement) participants have never formed a political party nor
have they pursued political ambitions,” explained Fethullah Gulen in an Op-Ed he wrote for the
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New York Times contrary to the evidence that himself provided only twenty years ago.427 In
Kucuk Dunyam, Gulen said that he never accepted the coup of 1960; even though he was distant
to political parties he favored the Democrat Party because of their relatively softer approach to
Islamic services.428 In the same interview, he recounted a memory where he wanted to establish a
foundation against Communism in Erzurum but did not have the chance to do so.429 Gulen later
played an imported role in the state-sanctioned anti-Communism movement.430 Gulen recounted
another memory where he planned to talk about Deccal (Al-Masih ad-Dajjal, simply the antiChrist) at the mosque on the last day of Ramadan, and he claimed that the mosque turned into a
“meeting” place; the word “miting,” literally meeting, in Turkish is only used for political
gatherings.431
Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement had also been portrayed as progressive in
women’s rights by the American academia. Gulen’s relatively relaxed stance on headscarf [he
states that it was not mandatory to wear the headscarf, a pious woman could uncover her hair if
the circumstances arise, referring to the headscarf ban in public institutions such as schools and
universities that was in place before the Justice and Development Party lifted the ban in 2007 for
universities, and completely in 2013] was simply enough for many of the academics to believe
that Gulen and Gulenists deeply cared for the inclusion of women in public life and their equality
to men.432 The Gulen Movement’s perception as a progressive movement was prominent among
Western politicians in addition to scholars. The former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was
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a keynote speaker at Gulen Institute Luncheon Forums in 2008, where Kofi Annan was also a
speaker only two years after Albright.433 Albright stated that the world lacked a direction and
needed a pathfinder. This role cannot be filled by “radicals, aggressive nationalists, autocrats,
apostles of the holy war” but it may be filled by someone who shared Gulen Institute's values;
which were "commitment to international dialogue and understanding of cultural diversity,
support for human justice and the love of peace."434 Annan, in his 2010
speech, promoted Gulen as a champion of 21st Century values such as “freedom, equality,
solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and the environment, and the shared responsibility for
humankind.”435 A recent article published on FoxNews.com, written by the Gulenist Rumi
Foundation’s president, argued that Erdogan’s so-called witch-hunt in Turkey targeted
the Gulenists because they were moderate Islamists and defined the movement as:
The witch-hunt has targeted the coeducational, non-denominational schools, stressing
math and science, which serve diverse populations across the world and in the US. In this
battle between the strongman and the scholar, Americans should recognize Mr. Gulen as
an advocate of human rights, religious freedom and world peace.436
An article published on GulenMovement.us, written by Sait M. Yavuz, explained
Gulen’s approach to gender equality by stating that he did not support “the ‘western champions
of women’s rights,” and continued “in [Gulen’s] words ‘most champions of women’s rights and
freedom only excite women with physical pleasure and then stab her spirit.’ Gulen thinks that for
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the sake of so-called freedom, women were used as objects of pleasure, means of entertainment,
and materials for advertisement, which reduced ‘freedom’ to sexual liberty.”437 Yavuz explained
how Gulen saw equality among genders:
Gulen thinks that there is no obstacle in front of women in having equal rights and
responsibilities with men; however, women and men have been physically and
emotionally different so that gender roles have had to suit these differences […] Men
have been physically stronger and apt to bearing hardship, while women are more
compassionate, delicate and self-sacrificing. Therefore, the responsibility of motherhood
is given to women, so that they naturally become the first nurturers, educators, and
trainers of the new generation. This makes women the first teachers of the humanity,
which is a unique position bestowed upon them by God.438
As it was clear in Yavuz’s article, Gulen had a traditionally conservative view of gender roles.
While he explicitly stated that women could work for wages outside of their homes, however, the
main duty of a woman was to serve; first to God and then to her family since the primary role of
the woman is motherhood in Gulen’s eyes.
Gulen was usually considered moderate because of his views of the Islamic headscarf.
He argued that covering the hair was not a religious necessity for women and the education
should be chosen over wearing the hijab. This was essential for the movement to gain more
followers during the years where the headscarf and hijab were banned in public spaces in Turkey
(such as schools, universities, military institutions etc.)439
Aside from his relatively moderate views on the headscarf, Gulen’s actions and speeches have
proven that he was promoting a sexist and a dangerous ideology, which threatens not only the
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hopes for gender equality but also the established women’s and LGBTQ+ rights. An article, that
did not appear on the same website’s English language version, entitled
“Peygamber Efendimizin Kadınları Dövme Tavsiyesi Nasıl Değerlendirmelidir?” written by
Gulen, advised men on how to beat their wives properly.440 In this article Gulen strongly
defended men’s right to beat their wives by stating that after everything else failed to subdue a
rebellious wife, “Who in their right mind would object the beating [as the last resort?]441 Any
form of violence and domestic violence are illegal under the Turkish law and there is a specific
law that aimed to protect women and children – or any person – who are victims and/or under the
threat of domestic violence or stalking.442 Gulen, by publishing this article clearly encourages
men to beat their wives, therefore to break the Turkish law.
A conference, organized by the Journalists and Writers Foundation in 2010 on family –
an organization closely associated ties with Fethullah Gulen since he is the honorary president –
hosted Allen C. Carlson as the keynote speaker. Carlson was the emeritus president of the
Howard Center for Family, Religion & Society, a tax-exempt institution that works against
women’s and LGBTQ+ rights.443 According to Carlson contraception and sexual intercourse,
other than for reproduction, were great dangers for the future of the society.444 Carlson’s speech
from another conference, given under the same title, defined the traditional family as the
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marriage of man and woman, and argued that only the societies with traditional families could
have prosperity. Carlson relied heavily on the Bible to prove his points.445 Overall, there is a clear
inconsistency between Carlson’s views and the Gulen movement’s perceived “progressiveness.”
However, since the same conference declared homosexuality as a disease that needed to be
fought against and also classified homosexuality along with incest and urged religious marriages
to be recognized [punishable with jail time according to the Turkish law when not accompanied
with legal marriage] while arguing that measures should be taken to discourage abortion,
Carlson’s and Gulenists’ views clearly align.446
A Gulen affiliated internet source on Islam, the Way to Truth, claimed that “God’s
Messenger” advised marrying childbearing women and preferring virginity. The source stated
that a virgin woman was more likely to be pleased by a man and less likely to be devious and
deceiving. The source noted that both parties should be virgins while indicating that women were
prone to being devious and deceiving.447 The source stated that “a girl” [the word girl describes a
virgin woman, regardless of her age] had a right to choose her spouse and her father or guardian
cannot ignore her wishes.448 What was being said here was that women were under the
guardianship of someone rather than being independent individuals. This was made clearer under
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the section of Nikah, which means a marriage contract, where the source stated the following is
required for Nikah to be valid:
The presence of the woman’s guardian or representative (waliy). The waliy is a Muslim
man charged with marrying a woman entrusted to his care to a man who will be good for
her.449
The section Women to Whom Marriage is Prohibited was directed towards men, hence
the indicated that men could choose their spouses but women could not.450 The same source
argued that Muslim men cannot marry any woman who practices idolatry and could only marry a
previously married woman if her husband died or divorced her. Again, the indication was that a
woman could not control her own life and could simply be “divorced.”451 The source directly
talked to women on one certain occasion where it forbid them from marrying any non-Muslim
men, even if they were “People of the Book” [referring to Christians and Jews] while Muslim
men were told that there was no limitation on marrying women from the same category.452
The source touched upon the gender equality issues as well, and stated that the men and
women were created equal but are not the same:
This distinction between equality and sameness is vital. Equality is desirable, just, and
fair; but sameness is not. People are created as equals, and not as identical to each other,
and so there is no basis to consider a woman to be inferior to a man. There is no reason to
assume that she is less important than he just because her rights are not identical to his.
Had her status been identical with his, she would have been no more than a duplicate of
him, which she is not. The fact that Islam gives her equal – but not identical – rights
shows that it takes her into due consideration, acknowledges her, and recognizes her
independent personality. […] However, we should acknowledge that a woman’s heart is
the most compassionate, loving and generous of all hearts. This is why the Qur’an stresses
men’s inclination toward and attachment to women, rather than the other way. In fact, it
states that the most beautiful blessing in Paradise for a man will be a pure woman. […]
God has not created all people exactly the same in all respects; rather, He has given each
superiority in some respect to others, as required by social life, the division of labor, and
449
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the choice of occupation. Although it is not true to the same degree for all men and
women, as He has created men superior to women in some respects, He also has given
women superiority over men in others. For example, God has given men greater physical
strength, endowed them with a greater capacity for management, and has charged them
with the family’s financial upkeep. This is why He has made men the head of the family.
However, this does not mean that men have absolute authority over the family, for this
authority must be exercised according to the Prophetic principle: The master of a people
is he who serves them. In addition, responsibility is proportionate to authority and
authority is proportionate to responsibility.453
When it came to polygyny the source stated that it was uncommon in Muslim societies but
defended the practice with Billy Graham’s views:
No one is unaware of the part mistresses play in Western society. In this respect Islam is a
fundamentally honest religion, and permits a Muslim to marry a second wife if he must,
but strictly forbids all clandestine amatory associations in order to safeguard the moral
probity of the community.454
Also, the unequal inheritance in Islamic law was explained by the women’s lesser earning
capacity and since the husband took care of the wife, the source argued that men should inherit
more.455 While this source may not reflect Gulen’s own views, the close association indicated
that Gulen and Gulenists were not bothered by the content.
Fethullah Gulen himself had written about how to raise female children in 1962. Since
the article could be found on Gulen’s official website without any edits it is fair to assume that
Gulen’s view on this matter had not changed since 1962. Gulen stated that if women would adopt
men-like characteristics and men adopt women-like ones it would cause degeneration in the
society. Girls should be raised lady-like and encouraged to perform lady-like duties like sewing.
Gulen strongly emphasized that girls should not wear boys’ clothing. He stated that just like
when men try to act and look like women, it was equally unsympathetic and ugly when women
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adopt men-like traits. He warned parents that if they let this happen the child will become
“Something in between men and women, a third gender,” and women or men acting like the
opposite gender were cursed.456 The Gulenist hostility to LGBTQ+ individuals was apparent in
this article.
Gulen’s views on HIV, a disease that is known for destroying many LGBTQ+
communities, are controversial as well. As a leader who promoted “Freedom, equality, solidarity,
tolerance, respect for nature and the environment, and the shared responsibility for humankind,”
in Kofi Annan's’ words, Gulen stated that he was ashamed to talk about HIV and that Muslims
were the least impacted community of the HIV crises because of their way of life. Even though,
he argued, there were campaigns for Muslims to renounce that way of life in an article entitled
“Is It Right When People Link HIV to “The Beast of the Earth” (Dabbat al-ard), One of the Signs
of the Last Day?” In this article, Gulen argued that HIV and AIDS were just two of the impurities
the “modern lifestyle” brought.457
Gulen explained in Kucuk Dunyam that when the judge asked him about his previous
remarks regarding women during a trial, he explained that he sometimes preached to women and
he stopped shaving a while before these sermons and always appeared with a beard before
women. Gulen said that he warned women to look in front of them rather than looking at his face
when he was preaching and classified his behavior as something that was in favor of religion
despite the court tried to use it against him.458 Another issue the Turkish court took with Gulen,
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according to Gulen himself, was his words on the contemporary youth. He warned the
congregation of young people for almost making love on mosque windows and drinking next to
mosque walls. Gulen explained that he was asked if he said: “If these people would not be
schooled based on Islamic ideals they would drink wine from their fathers’ skulls.” He accepted
the quote and stated that he did not see anything wrong with these statements and asked the
reader if there was anything wrong with them.459
Gulen repeatedly mentioned supernatural occurrences throughout the book; he seemed
to be under the impression that a greater being was communicating with him through his
dreams.460 He recounted that in order to buy flooring for a new Imam Hatip [Islamic equivalent
of a seminary] that was under construction he had to talk to a woman, even though he did not
want to. He stated that even if it was hard for him to talk to a woman he compromised on his
principles for a greater good; strangely they did not buy anything from that woman, he added.461
Gulen also explained that he only thought about getting married when he had too much dirty
laundry.462 Furthermore, Gulen mentioned of two women at a local organization in Erzurum. He
defined them by their lack of headscarves but added that these women perceived themselves as
covered relative to how other women dressed since they at least wore long skirts.463 He stated
that when his father came to visit him during his military service, he could not find a “clean”
hotel for his father to stay. This was because every hotel accepted women as guests. He explained
that this situation was against his understanding of decency. He further explained that he spoke in

459

Ibid, 93.
Ibid, 115, 142, 144, 174.
461
Ibid, 111.
462
Ibid, 63.
463
Ibid, 77.
460

110

favor of vandalism against these hotels and that one time he asked that the government controlled
the law enforcement and if they did not intervene with this “immorality” then who would?464
Gulen’s view of women does not fit his perception as a progressive Islamic scholar who
supports women’s rights and modern education or to his perceived tolerant approach to different
cultures and religions. His rhetorical question regarding the hotels that accepted women as
customers indicated a clear political objective. Yet, Sophia Pandya in the introduction she has
written for The Gulen Hizmet Movement and Its Transnational Activities: Case Studies of
Altruistic Activism in Contemporary Islam, stated that accusing the movement of being
patriarchal would eliminate the role taken by women in the movement.465 Gulen was being
portrayed as a progressive religious leader while there was clear encouragement to not to
question or criticize the blatant sexism of the movement.
When compared to extreme Islamic movements, such as Wahhabism, Gulen’s
interpretation of Islam employs a rather progressive outlook. However, since Gulen’s ideology
originated in an essentially secular country it would not be logical to compare Gulen’s views to
some of the more extreme interpretations of Islam originated in different nations. Gender-specific
violence and discrimination based on gender, two ideas that are encouraged by Gulen were
crimes according to the Turkish Civil Law that was in effect from 1926 to 2001 and still are
according to the current Civil Law.466
Gulen was also praised for claiming that Islam and modern science must and should coexist. Graham Fuller explained that during the research period of his book, The Future of
Political Islam, he “found Hizmet to be remarkably moderate, tolerant, non-violent, open to
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dialogue, a social rather than political movement, and a strong proponent of education as the
means to empower Muslims in a globalizing future. […] I still believe that Hizmet as a
movement represents one of the most encouraging faces of contemporary Islam in the
world.”467Again, in Kucuk Dunyam, Gulen explained how enraged he was when he heard about
the possibility of the Quran published in Turkish with the Turkish alphabet. He stated that he
perceived this event as a move against Islam.468 A relatively radical reaction by a person who
claimed to favor modern education and encourage knowledge since a translated Quran meant
easier access to it for the majority of the Turkish people who did not speak Arabic. When asked if
he had any doubts about his beliefs Gulen recounted an event he had experienced when he was
younger. During this time Gulen was reading a Turkish author’s novel [neither the author nor the
novel’s name was given] where the author mentioned Darwinism [the theory of evolution] and
the possibility of evolution influenced Gulen temporarily. Gulen explained that he “recovered”
from this episode of doubtful anxiety where Satan was trying to impose these thoughts onto
Gulen with the help of God.469 He also stated that if he had any power he would have had written
about the inconsistencies in the theory of evolution. He stated that there should be serious works
that explained and provided evidence for the creation. Anything that refutes creationism should
not be tolerated, Gulen said; if there was a single person who stopped praying because of the
influence of evolution that would be the worst trouble that he could imagine.470
To avoid anti-religious influences, Gulen supports “proper brainwashing.”471 He said
that the questioning of religion should not exist in the first place and that people should be
467
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conditioned not to question. Belief, he said, was not conditioning, but conditioning should come
after belief was established. Individuals must not let think of any of these beliefs that were
against the religion and that every individual should be conditioned to think like this.472
Fethullah Gulen strongly emphasizes creationism. “Kur’ân-ı Kerim’de ve Hadisi Şeriflerde Yaratılış” is an article written by Gulen, aimed to prove that creation was based on
the Quran.473 Another source where Gulen’s hostility to modern science was apparent was an
introduction written by him for a biology textbook entitled “Towards Alternative Biology.” The
authors of the book vehemently argued against evolution.474 Gulen also answered a question
regarding the first human beings in the Americas and explained how the first peoples got to the
Americas, after mistakenly stating that the evolutionary argument claimed that people have had
evolved in the Americas.475
Gulen even wrote a book called the Creationism Reality and Evolution, where he tried to
prove that creation was, in fact, factual while evolution was still a theory.476 In an interview
conducted with Gulen for the daily newspaper Milliyet, Gulen stated that the military general
Kenan Evren, who enacted the Coup of 1980 and held responsible for a series of executions of
political prisoners, would eventually go to heaven despite his “sins” because he made religion
classes mandatory for all school children. 477 These religion classes were not comprehensive
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survey classes but they were designed to teach solely Sunni Islam to students and aimed to shape
them to be obedient to the state.478
Gulen’s promotion of evolution was not limited to his own writings. Sizinti was a
magazine owned by the Gulen movement until it got shut down by
the Turkish government following the coup attempt in 2016. The former vice-president of the
Institute for Creation Research, Duane Gish’s article on creationism and evolution was published
in Sizinti. Gish was a Young Earth creationist and had been to Turkey for more than one occasion
to attend conferences on creationism. Gish, in this article, defended the need for teaching
creationism because evolution was an outdated theory.479
Gulen is a strong supporter of Abrahamic religions. He argued that any nation that did
not have a belief was condemned to disappear.480 Religion was essential for a person’s wellbeing, and even if the non-believer person was well educated there could be no possible way for
this person to be beneficial [to the society].481 Gulen argued that being a non-believer brought
many unfortunate symptoms such as bad luck.482 Gulen argued that non-believers would work to
fulfill their endless desires, would go to hell before they die and eventually they would die
alone.483 According to Gulen non-believers lost their interest in compassion and mercy. At this
point in the article, Gulen quoted an uncited source that claimed that “no mercy” should be
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shown to non-believers who were experiencing the drunkenness of denial, just like “no mercy”
should be shown to people who were engaging in vandalism when they were drunk on wine.484
Then he added that even if they were shown mercy, they would not accept it because their hearts
would be closed.485 “No mercy” in this context can be interpreted as having violent connotations
but it can also mean to ignore these individuals when trying to convert people to Islam. Gulen
claimed that non-believers would be able to perform any kind of evil act and that it would be
impossible to persuade them to believe in religion.486 Gulen argued that non-believers were
harmful to the public order.487
Gulen has had been recently accused of comparing atheists to terrorists for the following
quote stating that "Those who kill a person will suffer the same fate as unbeliever."488 Gulen later
retracted this statement and provided an explanation regarding the context.489 Gulen argued that
atheism spreads because “Education is misused, young people are neglected, and schools actually
defend and foster it.”490 According to Gulen God’s existence manifests itself in nature, and he
added that “Planets and stars move within an interrelated complexity of drifts and orbits that are
infinitely more precise than anything we could ever design or make. If what we make is accepted
as evidence of intelligent design, why is the far more vast and complicated universe considered
an exception to this rule?”491 Gulen blamed French existentialists and Western European
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influence that valued individual freedom more than religious education and “less careful”
scientists for the spread of atheism. Scientists were blamed for offering only theories than
scientific truths and that public opinion tended to value these scientists rather than “more
valuable ones.”492
For example, many textbooks and encyclopedias continue to present humanity's
evolution from apes to human beings as fact instead of theory. In reality, a
growing number of scientists, most particularly evolutionists, argue that Darwin's
theory of evolution is not a truly scientific theory at all. Many critics of the highest
intellectual caliber admit that we still have no idea of how this "evolution" took
place. While there is a great deal of divergent opinion among the experts about
probable causes and the actual process, the general public and less-informed
scientists continue to believe in it.493
Gulen clearly stated that they (he uses the word we) should target the atheists whose beliefs were
not firmly established and must teach them the truth.494
Gulen thinks that it was humanity’s most important duty to “enlighten others with
knowledge of the true religion and the duties that accompany it.”495 Gulen stated that everyone,
regardless of their age and status, must tell other people “What he is supposed to tell.”496 Gulen
advised to approach the subject by giving gifts, or helping them first, and become their friends
before inviting them to faith. He advised that the person must be careful and considerate to not to
scare the possible convert away from them and Islam. This was only possible by knowing
possible convert’s “level of faith, knowledge and culture.”497 Gulen heavily emphasized the
earning trust and friendship of possible convert to a degree where their friendship “weigh heavier
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than that of his other friends.”498 Gulen warned his followers to be careful during the time where
many “Obstinate people have come to soften their attitudes to Islamic matters and even begun to
consider them as feasible. Therefore, at such a time, it is incumbent upon us to develop, employ
and evaluate new methods and approaches, provided that we do not depart from the essence and
spirit of the truth.”499
The evidence, that is easily accessible through a simple internet search, demonstrates
that Gulen and the Gulen movement are in fact not moderate nor progressive. Gulen supports
creationism over scientific consensus while arguing that he supports modern scientific education
and that science and Islam must co-exist. As we see from his own writings, Gulen supports
science only when it conforms to the Quran. Similar this his scientific views, Gulen is extremely
anti-women and anti-LGBTQ+, to a point where not only he supports violence against women
but he also sees women as sub-humans who are to be disciplined by men. In addition, Gulen is
not tolerant in the sense that he tolerates other beliefs and lifestyles, he is just tolerant enough not
to violently subdue the things he claimed to tolerate. Gulen sees non-Muslims as possible
converts and instructs his followers how to successfully deceive these targeted people into
conversion. It is, therefore, quite clear that the American academics were actually employing
Orientalism when portraying Gulen as moderate and/or progressive. The academics, who favored
Gulen absolutely set lower standards for a Muslim movement because they believed that Gulen’s
ideology was progressive for all Muslims. Naturally, this sentiment carried on to create a public
opinion in America since the New York Times and the Wall Street Journalists also employed the
same approach, possibly in order to not to challenge the academia.
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CONCLUSION: THE FALSE REPRESENTATION OF THE GULEN MOVEMENT AS A
RESULT OF PERSISTENT ORIENTALISM
As this thesis demonstrates, despite the efforts to adopt a more neutral and balanced
approach to cultures and societies that are not Western, the Orientalist approach persisted both in
the academia and in journalism. Orientalism evolved to neo-Orientalism and even disguised itself
as self-Orientalism.500 The otherness of Muslims and Muslim societies have had been
emphasized by the news media in the United States. For this thesis, I examined the approaches of
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal to see if they employed differing approaches to
Muslims and Islam. In order to have a clear demonstration, I chose the time-frame between 1985
and 2016. The date 1985 was significant because it was a time where the Cold War was still
relevant to the United States yet the growing radical Islam also started to pose a significant threat.
Starting my research on Orientalism in the news media from 1985 also allowed me to examine
the evolution of the approaches, or the lack of it, with rather significant events. The most
important of these events was the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York
City in 2001. Al-Qaeda, a radical Islamic terrorist organization, was behind this atrocity that cost
more than two-thousand lives and eventually led the United States into a war in Afghanistan in
2001. During this time, the media portrayal of women especially became important for the
Americans, portraying Afghan women as in need of Western rescue grew prominence according
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Cultural relativism, for example, originated in the 20th century as a reaction to cultural evolutionism, a theory that
assumed all human progress is linear, and cultures progressed from “primitive” to “modern.” Franz Boas is
considered one of the first scholars to challenge the concept of linear progress by stating that the criteria which
measures success is obscured by biases and added “general theory of evaluation of human activities, as taught by
anthropological research, teaches us a higher tolerance than the one which we now profess.” Boas’ students Ruth
Benedict and Melville Herskovitz echoed Boas’ ideas. As Herskovitz described in Cultural Relativism:
Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism “Evaluations are relative to the cultural background out of which they arise.”
Michael Singer points out that cultural relativism developed as a reaction to Western cultural superiority. Alison
Dundes Renteln, “Relativism and the Search for Human Rights,” American Anthropologist 90, no. 1 (1988): 57.;
Franz Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man (London: Forgotten Books, 2015), 225.; Ruth Benedict, Patterns of
Culture (Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005). Dundes Renteln, “Relativism and the Search for Human
Rights,”: 57.
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to experts. In addition to the war in Afghanistan, the Iraq War of 2003 was also sometimes
justified on the grounds of liberating Muslim women from their Muslim male captors. The
original research question for this thesis was “Why does the media portray the Gulen movement
positively?” but as I broaden my scale and focused on the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the
media, and specifically in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal the distorted view and
the otherness of Muslims became apparent.
The reason why I decided to focus on the New York Times and Wall Street Journal was
to be able to see if there were any differences between the two newspapers that are known to
represent and serve to differing ends of the political spectrum. The New York Times, the
newspaper of record, one of the most trusted newspapers in the world, usually identified as a
liberal-leaning newspaper. The majority of its readers also identify as liberals rather than
conservatives. While the Wall Street Journal is the opposite, being almost equally large by
circulation and trusted source of news usually classified as a conservative-leaning medium.
Because of this clear difference between the newspapers, it was surprising to discover that both
of them employed an almost identical approach to Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam. The
existing research on the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the news media supported these
findings. Especially since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and with the rise of Taliban, the
portrayal of Muslims and Islam became synonymous with the other, uncivilized, barbarous,
dangerous, and irrational; and in the case of Muslim women in need of Western help. Edward
Said’s definition of Orientalism consisted mainly four different characteristics; the otherness of
Muslims and Islam, the homogeneousness of Islam, Islam and Muslim’s resistance to change,
and the overgeneralization of the Orient as a whole. The news articles I examined for this thesis,
except for a handful of nuanced and neutral articles, employed all four of these characteristics.
In addition to examining the portrayal of Muslims and Islam, and the approach
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employed by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, I examined the same newspapers’
portrayal of the Gulen movement in order to have a clear understanding of their approach to
Gulen and the Gulen movement. After the examination of the New York Times and the Wall
Street Journal for articles related to the Gulen movement, the evidence revealed that only the
New York Times reported extensively on the corruption allegations regarding Gulen affiliated
charter schools in the United States. The evidence also demonstrated that both of these
newspapers positively portrayed the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen himself. While it is
important to note that both newspapers published critical articles of the movement and Gulen,
most of the articles were completely ignored the controversies surround Gulen and the
movement. It was also revealed after examining the articles that, even the journalists who
employed critical approaches to the Gulen movement avoided providing an in-depth criticism of
Gulen’s ideology. As demonstrated in the second chapter of this thesis, the Gulen movement is a
highly political, non-secular movement that supports gender inequality and theories that are
considered unscientific by the consensus. While most journalists in both of these sources referred
to Gulen simply as a cleric, or an imam, their articles lacked any proper information regarding
Gulen’s ideology. The sympathetic articles defined Gulen’s ideology as “moderate” and even
argued that Gulenists and Gulen believe tolerance and the compatibility of science and religion.
While Gulen’s ideology could be considered moderate for some Muslims, not all Muslims would
consider Gulen progressive or moderate. The Turkish critics of Gulen, usually consisted of
people from the Turkish Armed Forces according to these articles, were dismissed as “seculars,”
and their concerns were oversimplified as radical views. While some of the articles pointed out
that Gulen was tried for trying to establish an Islamic state and provided the leaked footage of
Gulen where he was instructing his followers to infiltrate the state institutions, these articles
never provided any information on Gulen’s ideas that would be considered radical by the Turkish
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state such as advising violence against women. I argued that the positive portrayal of Gulen that
disregarded his non-moderate and non-progressive ideology stemmed from the Orientalist
approach. The journalists’ approach was essentially Orientalist since almost all of them argued
that Gulen was moderate while not defining what moderate was, and moderate in relation to what
or who. In short, Orientalism was persistent in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal
and because of this the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen have had been portrayed
inaccurately.
Another reason for journalists to portray Gulen and the Gulen movement in a certain
way was the perception of Gulen by the academia. While Gulen has had been criticized by some
European and Turkish scholars, there was an absolute favoritism of Gulen in the American
academia. The latest section of my thesis demonstrates why Gulen cannot be considered
moderate or progressive. While both Gulen and Gulenists misrepresented their ideology by
giving false statements about their beliefs, I argue that since almost all the information I accessed
when I was writing this thesis was available online and could be reached with a simple Google
search, it was also Orientalism that led the scholars to think that Gulen was moderate. As I
mentioned above, some of Gulen’s beliefs could be considered moderate and even progressive in
comparison to some more conservative and/or radical interpretations of Islam. It is, however,
impossible to classify Gulen moderate or progressive in general since there are more moderate
and progressive Muslims than Gulen. Not all Muslims condone violence against women, hate
atheists, and the LGBTQ+ communities while believing that the theory of evolution is an
imperialistic tool of the West. In fact, in Turkey, where the Gulen movement originated,
evolution has been a part of national education curricula until very recently, while discrimination
based on religion has been outlawed since the 1920s. Violence against women is an issue the
Turkish society has been dealing, for example, domestic violence has been specifically outlawed
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since 1998.
The answer to my original question “Why does the media portray the Gulen movement
positively?” is that because of their Orientalist approach, the journalists overgeneralize all
Muslims as less moderate and less progressive than Fethullah Gulen’s ideology and falsely
portray him as the bright future of Islam. This approach is problematic for two distinct reasons.
First of all, it shows that Orientalism is still persistent well into the year 2016. And second of all,
while referring to Gulen as moderate and progressive these journalists falsely represent all
Muslims in a negative light. All the issues that Gulen’s ideology has, violence, hatred of women
and the LGBTQ+, scientific backwardness are already associated with Islam as a result of Islam’s
Orientalist portrayal. Presenting Gulen as moderate for saying that violent Jihad should not be
waged diminishes the value of actual moderate and progressive Muslims. This portrayal of Gulen
also indicates that even the moderate Muslims condones violence against woman and is hateful
towards certain groups. Which is simply not accurate. Portraying Gulen’s ideology as positive,
these journalists and academics, contributed to the stereotypes of Muslims, Islam and further
strengthen the prejudices against Muslims in the Western world.
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